



## **ACOTA Protection of Civilians Training Strategy:**

***Equipping Peacekeepers  
to Protect Civilians***

***Department of State (DOS)  
Africa Contingency  
Operations Training and  
Assistance (ACOTA) Program***



ACOTA Protection of Civilians Training Strategy:  
Equipping Peacekeepers to Protect Civilians

US Department of State (DOS), Bureau of African Affairs

Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) Program

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## Foreword

*The secret of all victory lies in the organization of the non-obvious.*

**Marcus Aurelius**

Peacekeepers are tasked with difficult challenges. Chief among the difficulties, although assigned a UN Security Council mandate to protect civilians, an explicit, coherent linkage of that mandate to tractable, multidisciplinary coordination, plans, and actions at the operational and tactical levels of conflict has been lacking.

Peacekeepers are charged with a high-level statement to protect civilians, but operate under ambiguous conditions regarding their authority and latitude to develop operational-level, multidimensional plans or execute tactical operations against threats to civilians. Effective, proactive approaches that are consonant with culture and context are not trained. Training that is provided is focused on the obvious skills required by a peacekeeper; that training is necessary, but it is not sufficient. Consequently, the resultant best efforts of peacekeeping units on the ground resemble piecemeal, ad hoc activities that are reactive, disjointed, and, too often, tragically ineffective.

This document is not a call to action; that need has been answered and is self evident in media reports. This document is the inaugural version of a Training Strategy intended to aid peacekeepers in answering past calls to action within a solid doctrinal framework and identified training requirements. To this end, this document begins to answer the United Nations core challenge of enhancing protection by United Nations peacekeeping missions, to include the development “of new protection tools, guidance, and standards.” (United Nations Security Council, 2010) Above all, it is intended to be actionable in preparing peacekeepers to meet this challenge.

A comprehensive solution will span many organizations and disciplines; it must involve more than the military tool. This Training Strategy supports the preparation of peacekeeping units – the commander, staff, subordinate units and teams, and the soldiers – in multidisciplinary approaches to the hard realities they will face protecting those who cannot protect themselves.

## List of Acronyms

**ACOTA** African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance  
**ACRI** Africa Crisis Response Initiative  
**AFRICOM** United States African Command  
**AMIS** African Union Mission in Sudan  
**AO** Area of Operations  
**AU** African Union  
**CIMIC** Civil-Military Cooperation  
**COG** Center of Gravity  
**CONOPS** Concept of Operations; Contingency Operations  
**CPX** Command Post Exercise  
**CSOS** Command and Staff Operational Skills  
**DDR** Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration  
**DFS** Department of Field Support  
**DPKO** Department of Peacekeeping Operations  
**DRC** Democratic Republic of the Congo  
**ECOMOG** Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group  
**ECOWAS** Economic Community of West African States  
**EMI** Effective Methods of Instruction  
**FDO** Flexible Deterrent Option  
**GPOI** Global Peace Operations Initiative  
**HN** Host Nation  
**ICISS** International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty  
**IDP** Internally Displaced Person  
**JPT** Joint Protection Team  
**MDMP** Military Decision Making Process  
**MEDCAP** Medical Civic Action Program  
**MILOB** United Nations Military Observer (see also UNMO)  
**MINUCI** United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire  
**MINURCAT** United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad  
**MINUSTAH** United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti  
**MONUC/MONUSCO** United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo  
**NEO** Non-combatant Evacuation Operation  
**OCHA** Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs  
**OFR** Operation Focused Relief  
**OHCHR** Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights  
**OPLAN** Operations Plan  
**PKO** Peace Keeping Operation  
**PO** Peace Operations  
**POC** Protection of Civilians  
**PSO** Peace Support Operations  
**PSOSST** Peace Support Operations Soldier Skills Training  
**QRF** Quick Reaction Force  
**ROE** Rules of Engagement  
**SGBV** Sexual and Gender-Based Violence

**SRSG** Special Representative of the Secretary General  
**TCC** Troop-Contributing Country  
**TPMD** Training, Planning, Management, and Development  
**TTP** Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures  
**UK** United Kingdom  
**UN** United Nations  
**UNAMID** African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur  
**UNAMIS** United Nations Advance Mission to Sudan  
**UNAMSIL** United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone  
**UNHCR** Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees  
**UNIFEM** United Nations Development Fund for Women  
**UNMIS** United Nations Mission in Sudan  
**UNMO** United Nations Military Observer  
**UNSC** United Nations Security Council  
**UNSRSG** Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General  
**UNOCI** United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire  
**UPC** Union des Patriotes Congolais  
**US** United States



## Executive Summary

The mission of the Africa Contingency Operations Training & Assistance (ACOTA) program is to enhance the capacities and capabilities of its African Partner Countries, regional institutions, and the continent's peacekeeping resources as a whole so that they can plan for, train, deploy, and sustain sufficient quantities of professionally competent peacekeepers to meet conflict transformation requirements with minimal non-African assistance.

The purpose of this inaugural version of the ACOTA Protection of Civilians Training Strategy is to aid in addressing the gap between strategic level mandates and the operational and tactical frameworks and practices required to successfully accomplish the peacekeeping mission while ensuring the Protection of Civilians.

The concept of Protection of Civilians (POC) has evolved over the past several years of United Nations (UN) operations. It has been shaped by a succession of initiatives and the collaboration of a broad, multidisciplinary stakeholder community. This Strategic Plan proceeds from the perspective that POC is an inherent aspect of peacekeeping, that the responsibility to protect civilians is incumbent on both the host country and the peacekeeping force, and that the peacekeeping force may be required to ensure the protection of civilians under conditions of the host country's inability or unwillingness to do so.

Peacekeeping forces have encountered a lack of tractable doctrine and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) in coming to grips with the challenges of protecting civilians. The doctrine and TTP presented in this Training Strategy draws from established US Joint doctrinal sources, and is intended to equip peacekeepers with tractable guidance and pragmatic tools to better accomplish their mission.

ACOTA training successfully establishes basic, requisite competencies in the peacekeeping force. This is a necessary precondition for duty as a peacekeeping force; however, it is not currently designed or resourced to be sufficient in equipping the peacekeepers with the knowledge and tools required to fulfill the specific UN mandates regarding Protection of Civilians.

Protection of Civilians training should address the needs of four echelons, and include multi-echelon training and exercises. The minimum echelons for POC training are leader training, collective training focused on units and teams, staff training, and individual soldier training. Additional training audiences, based on a specific security environment and context, may be identified.

Protection of Civilians should not be approached as a discrete task or competency; POC should be holistically integrated as an aspect of all tasks and missions. Peacekeepers operate in the human terrain of their Area of Operations, and to ignore POC in training is a failure to fully prepare the peacekeeping forces for the reality they will face.

This Training Strategy advances a three pronged approach to developing plans and courses of action supporting POC: Frame the Environment, Frame the Problem, and Consider Approaches to Solve the Problem. This methodology aligns with several nations' military decision making processes, and can usefully compliment and inform other approaches, including those of Non Governmental Organizations (NGO).

Focusing on pragmatic, tractable models to inform operations, the plan identifies five general categories of POC tactical operations: threat oriented (or, threat) community protection (or, protection), community

presence (or, presence), community benefit (or, benefit), and information operations. These categories are mutually reinforcing with significant interconnection and synergy. Each category is interdependent, and all categories must be actively executed to maximize the effectiveness of POC operations and optimize the probability of achieving success in furthering the UN mandates to protect civilians.

Lines of effort should describe how POC operations create a desired end state and how individual POC actions relate to each other and to achieving that end state. Operations contributing to POC can be depicted in relation to interagency efforts to develop a broader understanding of multidisciplinary POC actions occurring within the AO. Example lines of effort may include Governance, Information, Security, Economic, Infrastructure, and Population. Other lines of effort may be identified, dependent on the security environment's context.

This Training Strategy proposes that multi-echelon POC training (Leader, Unit and Team, Staff, and Individual) be provided to peacekeepers in each of the POC tactical operations categories (threat, protection, presence, benefit, and information operations), and the lines of effort most directly supporting POC. This would even further enhance the successful ACOTA training model and enable a more comprehensive program of instruction for peacekeepers. This will, however, require additional resources, including funding and time.



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## Introduction

US Joint doctrine addresses a broad range of military operations, including crisis response and limited contingency operations. Peace Operations (PO) are defined as those multiagency and multinational crisis responses and limited contingency operations to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation, rebuilding, and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. PO includes peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacemaking, peace building, and conflict prevention efforts. (Department of Defense, 2007)

Currently, there is no universally accepted doctrinal definition for protection of civilians. Troop contributors, Member States, the Security Council, bodies of the General Assembly, and mission staff often understand Protection of Civilians (POC) in different, even contradictory, ways leading to friction, misunderstanding, and inefficiencies in missions. (DPKO/DFS, 2010)

This document defines POC as the spectrum of activities, including *in extremis* military activities, necessary to support the humane treatment and security of non-combatants, without any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.<sup>i</sup>

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*Protection of Civilians (POC) is the spectrum of activities, including in extremis military activities, necessary to support the humane treatment and security of non-combatants, without any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.*

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Historically, civilians have suffered during periods of armed conflict. Typically, this suffering was related to collateral effects caused by actions directed against other armed factions. Since the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, however, civilian fatalities have increased multifold. (United Nations Children's Fund, 2000) Increasingly, modern conflict includes struggle between armed groups of non-state actors and state governments, and non-state actors against other non-state actors. Battles are frequently not symmetric engagements, but asymmetric and irregular in nature. The duration of these conflicts are often protracted and waged in the developing world. Where the distinction between combatant and non-combatant becomes blurred civilians are often specifically targeted by opponents for purposes of control, revenge, terrorism, or as a center of gravity to defeat the will of an adversary. The targeting of civilians in conflict, particularly women and children, destroys the fabric of a society and has the potential to create a culture of permanent instability – a failed society – in which it is difficult to restore the institutions and norms of a productive, rule of law oriented nation. Intervening in the affairs of such a state to protect civilians may not be only a humanitarian issue; it may be an issue vital to U.S. national interests.

Genocide and mass atrocities also threaten core U.S. national interests. They feed on and fuel other threats in weak and corrupt states, with dangerous spillover effects that know no boundaries. If the United States does not engage early in preventing these crimes, we inevitably bear greater costs—in feeding millions of refugees and trying to manage long-lasting regional crises. In addition, U.S. credibility and leadership are compromised when we fail to work with international partners to prevent genocide and mass atrocities.” (Albright & Cohen, 2008)

Violence against civilians can take many forms, including systemic criminality in which civilians bear the brunt of the loss, violence against women and children, deprivation, forced displacement, and genocide. These abusive acts have occurred repeatedly across the African continent in places like Côte d'Ivoire, Darfur, Sierra Leone, and Rwanda.

The peacekeepers' obvious reality is that protection of civilians is mandated, they will encounter atrocities, and they will be involved in protecting civilians. The task of this Training Strategy is to present an actionable approach to the non-obvious work involved in preparing them for this reality.

## Evolution of the Responsibility to Protect Civilians

The United Nations Security Council has specifically mandated the protection of civilians in various forms since 1999. However, the mandated protection is encumbered by caveats regarding force capabilities, areas of deployment, degree of threat to civilians, and host nation responsibility. The high-level wording of the mandates is the result of two fundamental concepts within the international community that are in tension. On one side are advocates of humanitarian intervention to protect civilians trumping other considerations; on the other side are advocates of a state's sovereign responsibility to protect civilians within their political borders. The desire to balance the concerns of both perspectives has resulted in mandates that are difficult to interpret and execute in peace operations.

The International Commission of Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) advanced the cause of civilian protection when it published *The Responsibility to Protect* in 2001. The Commission concluded that the responsibility to protect the citizens of a sovereign state is vested with the state, and when the sovereign power is unable or unwilling to uphold this responsibility the international community is responsible for their protection. (International Commission On Intervention And State Sovereignty, 2001) The Commission's work aided in reconciling the positions of advocates of humanitarian intervention and advocates of state sovereignty, and the ICISS position was formally adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2005:



UN Photo by Gonzalez Farran

138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.

139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications,



bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out. (United Nations General Assembly, 2005)

During a 2008 workshop on halting systematic attacks on civilians, there was consensus among international experts that civilians can be directly or indirectly protected, that military forces have a responsibility regarding the protection of civilians, and they are the most capable option for providing physical protection from direct attacks. (Holt & Smith, *Halting Widespread or Systematic Attacks on Civilians: Military Strategies & Operational Concepts*, 2008)

A panel of experts assembled at the UK Defence Academy in 2009 agreed, stating:

- Protection of Civilians should be a priority for PO and that regardless of the details of a specific mandate for protection of civilians, local and international communities expect peacekeepers to be proactive in protecting civilians and that failure to do so would undermine the credibility and legitimacy of the operation.
- A clear doctrine and training methodology is required to facilitate the challenges of planning and executing protection of civilians at the operational level.
- Soldier's have a pragmatic and moral obligation to protect civilians. (Giffen, 2010)

*Protection of Civilians can occur during a peace operation, or as part of a more robust intervention designed to specifically prevent or halt a mass atrocity. Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response Operations (MAPRO) have as their operational imperative the Protection of Civilians.*

Protection of Civilians can occur during a peace operation, or as part of a more robust intervention designed to specifically prevent or halt a mass atrocity. Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response Operations (MAPRO) have as their operational imperative the Protection of Civilians. While the by-mission mandate to protect civilians is now articulated by the UN, unfortunately a dearth of actionable guidance remains in how peacekeepers must plan, train, exercise, and operate to meet their responsibility to protect civilians under that mandate. (ACOTA, 2010)

## Overview of US Initiatives to Assist Peace Operations in Africa

Past training assistance to African Peacekeepers has shaped the existing status quo of training and assistance programs. A brief overview of recent, major initiatives is necessary to frame the requirements and constraints driving the current training and equipping demands levied on the ACOTA program's future design and conduct.

The terms "peacekeeping" and "peace enforcement" are found not in the UN Charter but generally describe actions taken under the Charter's Chapter VI, "Pacific Settlement of Disputes," Chapter VII, "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression," and Chapter VIII, "Regional Arrangements." Chapter VI of the UN Charter addresses peaceful means of establishing or maintaining peace while Chapter VII provides the UN Security Council (UNSC) with a wide range of

enforcement actions from diplomatic and economic measures to intervention by armed forces of member nations. Under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, regional organizations such as the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) may act to prevent, contain, or halt conflict in their respective regions. (Department of Defense, 2007) These authorities increase the importance of the ACOTA program's efforts to establish a consistent, universally accepted operational and tactical framework informing peacekeepers' planning, training, exercises, and operations.

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The 2010 National Security Strategy emphasizes, "The diversity and complexity of the African continent offer the United States opportunities and challenges." (Obama, 2010) In the past two decades, millions of African civilians have been killed because of the seemingly endless series of conflicts on that continent. (Williams, Enhancing Civilian Protection in Peace Operations: Insights from Africa, 2010) These deaths are part of the instability that has plagued much of Africa since the 1960's and prevented the realization of the continent's potential. As stated in the 2002 National Security Strategy, "In Africa, promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and desperate poverty." (Bush G. W., 2002) During a February 2009 address to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies Phillip Carter III, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs said, "For too long Africa has been an afterthought in U.S. foreign policy interests. In World War II, Africa was a strategic stepping-stone to the places that mattered in Europe. In the Cold War, Africa was a pawn in East-West struggles. Even as we Americans set in place well-intentioned economic development policies, it was too often with the idea of trying to do good for Africa, rather than to do good with Africa." (Carter, 2009)

There have been programs aligned with the idea of doing good with Africa, and the US Department of State's ACOTA program is a key security program example that is designed to prepare African peacekeepers to respond to crisis in areas of instability. To best accomplish that goal, the training provided to peacekeepers must address existing gaps and adapt to the dynamic and varied security environments that exist across Africa.

The continuing strategic emphasis on Africa coincides with an exponential increase in the requirement for, and demands on, UN Peacekeeping forces, the preponderance of them supporting the various conflicts in Africa at the operational and tactical levels: "With over 116,000 deployed personnel across 15 missions, the scale of UN peacekeeping today is unprecedented. The diversity of mission mandates stretches the UN's capacity to deliver on all tasks. Personnel, logistics, finance, and administration systems are struggling to support operations in some of the world's most inhospitable terrain. The necessary military capabilities are increasingly scarce in the face of rising global demand." (Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, 2009) The United States global military commitments have stretched the United States and various coalition partners to the point that increased peacekeeping commitments are physically and politically problematic. With the demand for capable peacekeepers rapidly outstripping the supply there is a critical need for increased global capacity. Four programs, the Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), Operation Focused Relief (OFR), the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), and the Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) program were designed with the specific goal of enhancing the UN peacekeeping capacity of African nations to support PO in Africa and advance the strategic, operational and tactical peacekeeping force capabilities and presence on the continent.



## Africa Crisis Response Initiative 1996-2002

Considerable effort has been exerted towards enhancing the capacity of African countries to participate in peace and humanitarian relief operations on the continent. The first initiative was the ACRI. Established in 1996, the goal of this program was to prepare African military forces to participate in UN peacekeeping and humanitarian operations by training them on UN Chapter VI peacekeeping tasks. (Committee on International Relations House of Representatives One Hundred Seventh Congress, 2001) The ACRI program was designed around a three-year, phased training program that would conduct initial baseline training and then conduct annual sustainment training. “ACRI was designed to work with African states to create highly effective, rapidly deployable peacekeeping units that could operate in a multinational PSO environment in the event of a traditional PKO mission or humanitarian crisis. The ACRI program began with the basic military skills and evolved through battalion and brigade level peacekeeping exercises.” (Karis D. G., 2009). Six ACRI trained units participated in 14 deployments to nine UN peacekeeping operations or humanitarian relief operations. (Committee on International Relations House of Representatives One Hundred Seventh Congress, 2001)

In his July 12, 2001 prepared statement to the Congressional Subcommittee on Africa, William M. Belamy, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Department of State, addressed the future of the ACRI program particularly the expansion into peace enforcement training:

“ACRI’s future is under interagency review. The enhanced capacity for peacekeeping and complex humanitarian response that ACRI partnership provides is very much in line with this Administration’s overarching goals in Africa. ACRI has developed significant support among you and your colleagues in the Congress, while also garnering respect in Africa. ACRI also reinforces the strong U.S. commitment to African militaries that serve at the direction of an elected civilian government and that operate in a professional manner without violating human rights. *There may be, however, ways for enhancing capacity for the full range of peace support operations requirements as they exist in Africa. While the ACRI program provides base peace support skills and trains partner militaries how to respond, via force protection, in an escalating military situation, ACRI does not cover the offensive combat aspects of Chapter VII peace enforcement, nor does ACRI provide lethal equipment.* [emphasis added] The purpose of the current review is to explore options for building upon the base ACRI has established and determine how best to assist Africans in their efforts to develop an effective capacity.” (Committee on International Relations House of Representatives One Hundred Seventh Congress, 2001)

Subsequently, the ACRI program was replaced by the ACOTA program in 2002.

## Operation Focus Relief 2000-2001

Operation Focus Relief was a short-lived Department of State program that was specifically designed to provide UN Chapter VII training for complex PO to troops from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which sent troops to Sierra Leone. (Belmakki, 2005) The deployment was in response to the May 2000 UN Peacekeeper hostage crisis in which Rebel United Front forces captured UN Peacekeeping forces. The non-permissive security environment in Sierra Leone fell outside of the UN’s Chapter 6 mandated training of ACRI forces and necessitated a separate program. Operation Focus Relief trained and equipped seven battalions over its 16 month lifespan. (Denning, 2005)

## Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) 2004

The Global Peace Operations Initiative is a Department of State program designed to address major gaps in international support for PO. During a 2003 dinner in Washington, DC, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said that, “I think that it would be a good thing if our country provided some leadership for training of other countries’ citizens who would like to participate in peacekeeping ... so that we have a ready cadre of people who are trained and equipped and organized and have communications that they can work with each other.” (Schrader, 2003) The program, unveiled in 2004, works in conjunction with the G8’s member states to increase the number of capable soldiers and police units for PO. One of the GPOI key objectives is to “train and, as appropriate, equip at least 75,000 peacekeepers worldwide, with an emphasis on Africa, to increase global capacity to participate in PO. (U.S. Department of State, n.d.) GPOI increases the scope and scalability of select programs, such as ACOTA by integrating capabilities with other regional and international programs to improve capacity for PO. (Boucher & Holt, US Training, African Peacekeeping: The Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), 2007)



UN Photo by Gonzalez Farran

## African Contingency Operations Training Assistance Program (ACOTA)

The U. S. Department of State, Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) Program is the successor to the ACRI program and has a requirement to enhance the capacity of qualified African Nations to participate in internationally mandated PO and contingency operations in Africa in accordance with U.S. Policy Objectives supporting the United Nations, the African Union, African Regional Economic Communities, the African Standby Force Concept, and Individual Troop Contributing Countries. The ACOTA Program enhances the PSO and contingency operations capacities of selected units by directly training and equipping African Peacekeepers, unit leaders, and associated staffs at the tactical and operational levels. The program is designed to develop an indigenous cadre that will be sustained over the long term to mentor and assist indigenous training, provide updated refresher training, provide limited equipment for training purposes, and upgrade training facilities. The training and equipping programs for each African partner nation are uniquely tailored to meet that nation’s special requirements. (U.S. Department of State, n.d.)

The ACOTA program expands on its ACRI predecessor’s capabilities in that ACOTA is able to prepare forces for UN Chapter VII peace enforcement missions and offers training packages tailored to specific mission sets, as opposed to the generic UN Chapter VI training associated with the ACRI program. Over 100,000 African peacekeepers have been trained by ACOTA or by ACOTA-trained trainers, and eight African nations are now in the top 20 of all contributors to UN peacekeeping operations. African states are contributing peacekeepers to missions not only in Africa, but also to UN operations in Lebanon and Haiti. (U.S. AFRICOM Public Affairs, 2008)

ACOTA currently trains African Peacekeepers at the battalion level and below. Training for one battalion lasts between 9 to 16 weeks based on unit needs and requirements. The increased demand for PO forces has gradually changed the ACOTA training model from general instruction in UN peacekeeping tasks to mission-specific, pre-deployment training for the units as they prepare to support UNMIS, UNAMID, and other PO.

### ***ACOTA Training***

- *Effective Methods of Instruction Course*
- *Training, Planning, Management, and Development Course*
- *Command and Staff Operations Skills Course*
- *Peace Support Operations Soldier Skills Training*
- *Command Post Exercise*

The training is based on United States Army doctrine and includes: the Effective Methods of Instruction (EMI) course and the Training, Planning, Management, and Development (TPMD) course, which are respectively focused on the planning and conduct of training at the individual and unit level; the Command and Staff Operational Skills (CSOS) course which is designed to provide the commander and staff instruction on planning and control procedures; the Peace Support Operations Soldier Skills Training (PSOSST) course which trains individual soldiers, sections, platoons and companies on essential, collective PO tasks in a hands-on, field environment; a command post exercise (CPX) designed to exercise the Battalion Commander and Staff on communications, planning, and operational skills in a simulated PSO environment; company grade officer and non-commissioned officer leadership training; and specialized courses in mechanized vehicles, engineering, and logistics. (See Annex IV)

## **Current ACOTA Protection of Civilians Training**

The ACOTA program has been extremely successful in preparing African forces to successfully participate in PO. The current program of instruction allocates 90 minutes of training specifically on Protection of Civilians during the CSOS and PSOSST courses. This hour and a half of instruction includes: how to understand a mission mandate; the obligation to provide protection for civilians; understanding what a civilian is; identifying the common threats to civilians; understanding the mission components that contribute to the protection of civilians; and methods to mitigate threats to civilians. (ACOTA, 2009) Analysis of the 114 ACOTA training modules reveals that only 30 periods of instruction teach aspects of Protection of Civilians. Twenty-five of them inadequately address the Protection of Civilian tactics, techniques and procedures presented in this Strategy and five periods of instruction are aligned with this Strategy to include: trafficking in persons, Rules of Engagement, cordon and search operations, child protection, and prevention of sexual exploitation.

The ACOTA program's current status quo of providing only limited POC training is the result of three factors. First, as detailed above, the ACOTA program's Program of Instruction (POI) is not directive in nature and is tailored to meet the training requirements of each unit based on assessment of the host country's requirements and anticipated mission tasks. Second, the current training level of the majority of the units selected for deployment as peacekeepers necessitates that significant effort be prioritized to training basic soldier and staff skills to ensure that the unit can properly function at a base level of competency. Third, time available bounds training. The current training model, although not broken, can be substantially improved and made even more relevant in regards to Protection of Civilians.

While much has been done by ACOTA trainers to prepare units to protect civilians, the primary focus of



the program is the preparation of units for the tactical aspects of a peace operation, to include a Chapter VII mandated mission. The adoption of an integrated, end-to-end training approach to POC that includes POC concepts in the planning, training, exercise and conduct of military tasks, as well as presenting POC concepts tailored to the unit's Area of Operations (AO), will ensure that units have a much better understanding of the concept of civilian protection and allow them to develop effective TTP that enhance their operations.

## Recommendations for a Strategic Policy on POC Training

There is not a dedicated doctrinal reference that is exclusively focused on the imperative of Protection of Civilians. However, several United States Army doctrinal sources do address protecting populations from lawlessness, collateral injuries, violence, and hostile actions. Protection of Civilians is an inherent responsibility of professional military forces derived from both professional codes of conduct and codified agreements, including the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the Protocols of 1977, and others. However, the nature of the current security environment, in which conflicts are more typically waged by groups decidedly not imbued with the ethos, norms, and formal education of professional military forces necessitates that doctrine informing POC operations by professional armies confronted by irregular opponents be developed and trained.

### Leader Training

Peace Operations are leader intensive. Leaders must be focused on those tasks that protect lives and property, achieve stability, and promote peace. Units are normally trained at the collective and individual levels for offensive and defensive operations. There are significant characteristics inherent to PO that not only require a mental adjustment from conventional military frameworks, but also require the unit to be proficient in other tasks. One such characteristic is a large civilian noncombatant population. If the lives and property of the civilian population are at risk from any of the belligerents, it will be difficult to achieve stability and promote peace. Leaders must be both trained and fully prepared to serve in non-traditional military roles, including as mediators, diplomats, and coordinators. Leaders at all levels must be prepared to solve large and small scale disputes and work with local, state and non-state actors, non-governmental organizations, interagency partners, and international representatives to find peaceful solutions to prevent conflict. In order to accomplish the mission mandate and protect civilians, leaders at all levels must have a thorough understanding of the conflict, be proficient in leading their forces in complex, ambiguous situations, understand the cultural differences and



ACOTA Photo

nuances in their AO, and have an understanding of the objectives of and be able to effectively collaborate and work with non-governmental organizations and interagency representatives.

### ***Leader Questions***

Leaders in Peace Operations constantly face decision making under conditions of uncertainty and complex risk. Being equipped with the right knowledge and being able to act on that knowledge separates failure from success. When faced with difficult dilemmas, crises, and emergencies, leaders and their advisors should ask and develop answers for the following questions (Flynt, 2007):

1. How do you protect life, property, and operations?
2. What information do you need to know and when do you need to know it?
3. What is your next decision, and when?
4. Who else needs to know, and what?
5. Are plans and policies leveraged?
6. What is my resource timing and availability?
7. What are the indicators of a worst case scenario?
8. Where and when should I be optimally located to exert decisive influence?
9. What are my authorities and constraints?
10. Who is affected by the primary, secondary, and tertiary effects of the situation?
11. Who are the key decision makers capable of improving the situation, how can they be influenced, and what is the desired decision or action they would take?
12. Who has decision making authority?
13. Is my message Consistent, Constant, Credible, Concise, and Clear?
14. What are the cultural limitations and expectations?
15. What pressure points, if stressed, improve the situation?
16. What patterns exist?
17. What external expertise is required?

### ***Conflict Background***

The nature of the conflict and the level of tolerance must be understood. Units conducting PO can find themselves in a permissive environment where all sides to the conflict tolerate their presence, a semi-permissive environment where some parties to the conflict oppose their presence, and a non-permissive environment where the majority of the belligerents do not tolerate their presence. The conflict may take several forms, even simultaneously, including among others a traditional war between two sovereign states, a rebellion, or an insurgency. Likewise, the civilian population might be neutral, hostile, or supportive towards one or more of the belligerents. Rarely will PO forces be viewed as neutral by all parties to the conflict. The leader of peacekeeping forces must treat all parties as they deserve based on their actions.

### ***Command***

Command is the ability of leaders at all levels to understand, visualize, describe, direct, and lead their force to accomplish the mission. Protection of Civilians is not a separate mission; it is inherent to all missions. All leaders should understand the security environment in which they are working, understand the core problems and motivations of the parties involved in the conflict, and the interrelationships between civilians, the society, subcultures, and the belligerents. The Commander of the peacekeeping force must be informed

through his intelligence operations of the status of the core problems in his AO, the “at risk” population(s) and their activities, the known threats to the force and the “at risk” population(s) and direct his tactical operations to influence these and related aspects of the AO. A key function of command is ensuring that all peacekeepers understand they possess the inherent right of self defense and are charged with the inherent responsibility to defend others.

### ***Expanded Cultural Awareness***

With over 50 countries and hundreds of ethnic groups, the cultural differences in Africa are immense. Peacekeepers, and key leaders especially, must receive cultural awareness training regarding the groups within their AO. This training facilitates interaction and communication with the different communities and actors, affording leaders a better understanding of the security environment. In addition to understanding the local cultures, leaders must also understand the politics and modus operandi of the host nation and the belligerents. Personalities and politics are keys to situational understanding and awareness of the boundaries of the possible within different cultures.



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## **Collective Training**

Success is protecting civilians. Attaining this success requires engagement with the population. Peacekeeping forces that remain in their compounds lose touch with the people they are charged to protect, appear to be intimidated by the belligerents, and cede the initiative. Varied operations, including aggressive patrolling, ambushes, and listening post missions must be conducted, and risks accepted, to maintain contact with the populace. The effectiveness of establishing patrol bases and operational support bases should be weighed against the efficiencies of using larger unit bases, with an adaptive balance struck between engagement and security. These and other practices create access to the information needed to drive effective peacekeeping operations. Operations that engage with and reinforce connections with the populace help establish the legitimacy of the peacekeeping force. (United States Army, 2006)

## **Unit Training**

Often, belligerent forces in many peacekeeping situations are not capable of sustaining prolonged conventional military operations and must resort to asymmetric, irregular tactics, often targeting the civilian population to accomplish their objectives. Threats include systematic violence, violence against women and children, rape, deprivation, forced displacement, trafficking in persons, torture, criminality, and genocide. Women and children are frequently the focus of brutal attacks – waged for the psychological and physical control of populations as much as territory. (United Nations, 2010) UN Security Council Resolution 1820 states that sexual violence when used to humiliate, dominate, instill fear in, forcibly disperse or relocate members of a community or ethnic group can be viewed as a tactic of war and may constitute a war crime, a crime against humanity, or a constitutive act with respect to genocide. (United Nations Security Council, 2008)



While it cannot be ruled out, belligerents will not normally mass forces or seek a decisive, operational-level engagement with a peacekeeping force. Their operations instead are tactical and opportunistically target vulnerable tactical units or segments of the population, exploiting weakness. A remote outpost manned by a few peacekeepers or a small convoy may be attacked. Similarly, isolated villages may be targeted to intimidate a group and to obtain essential resources like food, water, and fuel.

These and other general aspects of a peacekeeping security environment dictate that operations must be adaptive and relevant to the situation's context. Establishment of a large, fixed site compound with defensive positions, but that has little or no engagement with the indigenous populations and from which regional operations are not conducted, will not prove effective in protecting civilians.

Intelligence gained from engagement with the population is essential to effective unit operations. Consequently, unit operations must be designed and conducted that afford engagement with the population and create access to the information that will form the basis for relevant, actionable intelligence that drives operations. Unit training must emphasize such operations, in the context of the security environment and AO, and focus on the mutually reinforcing synergy between such operations and relevant, actionable intelligence.

## Protection of Civilians Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for POC fall into five categories that relate to Protection of Civilians: threat oriented, community protection, community presence, community benefit, and information operations. These categories are mutually reinforcing with significant interconnection and synergy.

The below examples of TTPs are not an exhaustive listing, but rather a start point for the peacekeeping force's leadership to consider and use.

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures provide detailed, specific guidance to military forces. Tactics are descriptive in nature and vary based on the situation. Tactics require judgment and change frequently as belligerents react and friendly forces explore new approaches. Techniques are non-prescriptive methods used to perform missions, functions, or tasks and are the primary means of inculcating lessons learned during operations. Specific techniques are utilized by leaders based on their assessment of the situation. Procedures are the detailed



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steps that prescribe how to perform specific tasks. (The Joint Staff, 2007) As there always exists situational variance affected by the security environment, threats, geography, equipment and other aspects, this document will address generic POC tactics during the conduct of PO that can inform the development of context and unit specific TTPs.

This Strategy proposes that multi-echelon training be provided to peacekeepers in each of the five tactical POC operations categories.

### ***Threat Oriented Tactics***

Threat oriented tactics are proactive measures focused against belligerents posing a threat to the civilian population. These tactics are proactive and facilitate the disruption of the belligerent's decision cycle and operations. Threat oriented tactics are typically offensive in nature and should be carefully analyzed in terms of unintended and secondary consequences before being executed. Careful consideration must be given to the potential benefits of taking offensive action against belligerents in order to protect civilians and the possible ramifications the offensive action will have on the peace process, civilians, and the force. Despite a considerable amount of rhetoric and international consensus regarding the protection of civilians, in practice, the political commitment to the right to protect is not clear and varies across governments. (Williams, Enhancing Civilian Protection in Peace Operations: Insights from Africa, 2010) An ambiguous commitment and uncertainty regarding the political will to protect civilians may hamper or complicate the conduct of any threat oriented tactics

Threat oriented tactics require detailed planning and rely heavily on accurate intelligence. Three examples of threat oriented tactics are cordon and search operations, raids, and forward operating bases.

### **Cordon and Search**

Searches can be an effective means to control belligerent actors and deny them resources. Searches can be targeted against specific groups or geographic areas. Searches should be conducted to capture suspected belligerents or secure material and evidence related to belligerent activity. Special care must be taken to ensure that forces conducting the search conduct themselves in a courteous and highly professional manner and are not abusive to the local population. The population's respect and support are critical for the long term success of the mission and strict attention must be enforced to ensure that engagement with the populace is not undermined by discourteous behavior or damage to property. Integration of civil affairs, and local military and/or police representatives, when appropriate, is an effective technique. Soldiers should be trained in conducting vehicular searches; complex area and confined space searches; and, personnel searches with special provisions, if required, for effectively searching females while honoring cultural context. Units should develop procedures for maintaining chain of custody for seized material; reparations and claims for damaged property; and processing detained individuals.

The designated search area should be secured to prevent suspect personnel from departing the search area and to prevent belligerents from entering. An effective way to secure a search area is to establish a cordon. Small search areas may only require one cordon, however typically two cordons, an outer and inner, are used. The outer cordon secures the entire search area and the inner cordon secures smaller search areas within the outer cordon. The level of control the cordon places on movement into and out of the search area is influenced by many factors. In a non-permissive environment a tightly controlled cordon should be established. In a permissive environment the cordon should be designed to minimize disruption to the daily lives of the community, while preventing threat penetration.

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### ***POC Tactics Categories***

- *Threat Oriented*
  - *Community Protection*
  - *Community Presence*
  - *Community Benefit*
  - *Information Operations*
-

## Raids

A raid is a temporary, rapid task that is conducted for a specific reason. In the context of Protection of Civilians a raid could be conducted to rescue captives being held as part of a human trafficking operation, sex trade, or torture. Raids involve detailed planning and execution to include the withdrawal from the objective area. Military raids are normally conducted in non-permissive areas and contingencies must be considered for all phases of a raid. Prior to the conduct of a raid, detailed intelligence analysis and reconnaissance are critical for mission success and, when possible, continual surveillance should be maintained on the objective from planning through execution. Security is critical to the success of a raid conducted in a non-permissive area. Unlike a raid conducted during a large, conventional conflict, a raid conducted during a peace operation can be expected to have extremely limited aerial and indirect fire support because of the risk of collateral damage and injuries, and the concern of alienating the population.

## Forward Operating Bases

Forward Operating Bases (FOB) extend the presence of PO forces and provide a secure location to plan, organize, and conduct missions. Positioning forces where they are most needed gives commanders a proactive deterrent to violence against civilians and a faster response time if action is required. The United Nations Development Fund for Women and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations found that temporary operating bases in Jonglei state and Abyei, Sudan showed positive preventative results. (United Nations, 2010) In addition to extending the presence and reducing response times of peacekeepers, FOBs can bolster civilian confidence and increase engagement in at risk areas.



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FOBs must be located in defensible locations and able to repel attack. Care should be taken to ensure that defensive fields of fire do not put the surrounding community at risk. Provisions should also be made for the temporary sheltering of at risk civilians within the operating range of the base. The base must be logistically supportable, and to the extent possible self-reliant for power, water, communications and other critical systems.

Forward Operating Bases can be scaled according to need and can be as small as a platoon outpost depending on the mission requirement. In addition to providing a deterrent and rapid reaction capability, FOBs provide entry into at risk areas for additional resources such as Joint Protection Teams, Medical Civic Action Programs (MEDCAP), and humanitarian organizations.

## ***Community Protection Tactics***

Community protection tactics are measures that can be taken to enhance the protection available to a community. These actions can be low risk and require minimum resources primarily involving community resources, or they can be intensive in terms of risk, resources, and manpower.



## Village Security Programs

These programs are limited only by the imagination and can be scaled based on available resources. Communities can be organized into watch teams. These teams know who is not supposed to be in the area and can alert peacekeepers using a variety of means, from ringing bells to using satellite telephones. Tying this alarm system to a FOB's Quick Response Force (QRF) and rehearsing the designated response protocol can provide a significant deterrent effect and response capability, where implemented. Finally, enabling populations to defend themselves strengthens their societal capacity and self-reliance, while reducing their dependence on the peacekeeping force.

## Lighting and Fencing

Well placed lighting systems in identified high risk areas and community gathering places can support reduction of the risks of criminal activity and rape. Lighting systems can be tied into existing infrastructure, or augmented with portable light sets and generators or solar charged battery systems.

Lighting can be augmented with fencing to shield civilians and force potential perpetrators into lighted, contained areas patrolled or controlled by neighborhood watch teams, police, and peacekeepers. Fencing can be constructed using concertina and barbed wire, or other locally available materials.

## Joint Protection Teams

Joint Protection Teams (JPT) are currently being successfully used by the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) to enhance civilian protection in high risk areas. These small groups of military, police, and civilian experts assess local conditions and security risks and make recommendations while building the confidence of local communities in the UN peacekeeping mission. (Whitman, 2010) JPTs have a significant force multiplying effect and additionally provide commanders with critical information regarding protection requirements and community concerns. Based on JPT recommendations, commanders can better allocate scarce resources and anticipate potential problem areas. The MONUSCO mission found that having female JPT members has provided valuable information that an all male team might not be able to access. On several occasions female JPT members were given information that resulted in reducing tensions between families of the DRC military and local communities as well as countering sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) threats local women encountered when traveling to the market and fields. (Whitman, 2010)

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*Extraordinary care must be taken when planning the security for a protected area as the consolidation of vulnerable groups creates lucrative targets for belligerents*

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## Medical Treatment / Evacuation of Rape Victims

Rape is a tragic circumstance of warfare in failing societies. Frequently used as a psychological tactic to demoralize or displace entire communities or ethnic groups, and other times as the opportunistic act of depraved soldiers, rape has a devastating effect on the actual victim as well as her family and community. The cultural implications for rape victims include assignment of blame, divorce, being ostracized from their families and communities, and potentially even death. Displaced communities with vulnerable female and child populations have a high degree of reported rape. (United Nations, 2010) Peacekeepers should be

trained on providing post rape response to victims. This response should include ensuring the physical safety, as well as respect for the wishes and privacy of the victim. Units should consider evacuation of rape victims to the nearest hospital or clinic for medical treatment and counseling, and plan for arranging shelter for victims who are no longer welcome in their families or communities in coordination with NGOs. Units should develop working relationships with UN agencies like the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and other NGOs for additional resources in assisting victims of rape.

## **Establish Protected Areas**

When a community is at risk from persistent attack the establishment of a protected area is an option to relieve some of the pressure placed on the community. Protected areas are similar to demilitarized or buffer zones in that belligerent parties and weapons are excluded from the area. Protected areas can support refugees, displaced persons, and residents of communities within the buffer zone. Extraordinary care must be taken when planning the security for a protected area as the consolidation of vulnerable groups creates lucrative targets for belligerents. Units must control access to and from the protected area using check points and traffic control points. Aggressive patrolling must be conducted both inside and outside of the protected area to ensure the safety of the protected individuals. Additionally, a quick reaction force should be maintained and defensive plans, including the actions of the civilians, should be rehearsed. Commanders should strongly consider locating a Forward Operating Base adjacent to or within operational range of the protected area. If the protected area is populated with displaced persons or refugees, the requirement to conduct security patrols and inspections within the protected areas increases. Tensions can occur between refugees and local residents, and active and former belligerents are often part of the displaced/refugee population. Women and children are at particular risk in these environments because of a lack of community and the close quarters living arrangements. Special care should be taken in the placement and the security of sleeping and bathing areas to prevent creating a security vulnerability.

## **Demining**

Removing the threat of mines can free fields for farming and animal husbandry, open roads to commerce, and allow the rebuilding of infrastructures, all while increasing the safety of the population. Demining operations are critical to establishing an environment that is conducive to establishing stability and opportunity, both key conditions that must be set for the protection of civilians.

## ***Community Presence Tactics***

Protection of Civilians requires an active and visible presence of PO forces, particularly in areas that are high risk for violent and criminal activity. Situational understanding and intelligence gathering and analysis are critical for timely and accurate identification of high risk areas and Human Intelligence (HUMINT) can be an effective means of identifying what is occurring within communities.

There are numerous daily activities that put community members, particularly women and children at risk. These activities are usually routine and follow an established pattern. Frequently, they occur in a specific location or area, they group large numbers of people together, and in some cases these activities isolate the group from the larger population. Examples include going to market, collecting water, collecting firewood, washing clothes, and working in fields.

## Protection Patrols

Patrols are an excellent means of providing a physical presence in communities, and inform valuable insight into the concerns, needs, culture and perceived threats of the local population. Patrols have the ability to deter criminals and belligerents, restore local confidence, disseminate public information messages, gather information, and provide an immediate response to events that occur during the conduct of the patrol. Some examples of patrols particularly suited to POC include:

### ◆ **Market and Trade Route Patrols:**

Markets and the trade routes to them are vulnerable areas for acts of criminality and violence. Market places should be regularly patrolled with emphasis on the prevention of intimidation, illegal arms sales, and crime. Trade routes should be incorporated into patrol schedules to ensure freedom of movement to and from markets, dismantle illegal checkpoints, deter bad actors, and to gather information. Secure markets and trade routes will enhance economic development and restore stability in conflict-torn areas.



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### ◆ **Field, Food, and Firewood Patrols:**

Working in fields, harvesting food, and gathering firewood are elements of daily life for many Africans. Women and children are the primary gatherers of food and fuel sources and often are required to venture far from their communities for extended periods of time to collect these resources or tend to their crops. This isolation from their larger community makes them vulnerable to SGBV. In many areas of Africa, firewood is the primary source of fuel for cooking and heating homes. In Darfur, villagers are required to travel for several hours, often departing before dawn to avoid the heat to gather enough fuel for their homes. The International Rescue Committee recorded 200 sexual assaults in a five week period from one refugee camp. (International Rescue Committee, 2006) Peacekeeping forces can coordinate to provide a scheduled firewood patrol to accompany villagers to reduce risk. These patrols can be relatively simple or can become complex operations based on availability and location of the fuel source and number of people collecting the fuel. The patrol must be aware that their patrol will be known to the belligerents, and plan for contingencies.

### ◆ **Water Route Patrols:** Similar in nature to firewood patrols, the collection of water is a routine task that puts civilians at risk. In addition to escorting the water gatherers, the patrol should scout ahead and secure the actual water point prior to the arrival of the main body. In areas where water supplies are scarce, belligerents often use the same water sources as villagers.

### ◆ **School Route Patrols:** Children are susceptible to multiple forms of victimization. They are often separated from their families, driven from their homes, killed, maimed, sexually abused, or exploited in



other ways. Young boys continue to be forcibly recruited or kidnapped by armed groups. (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2010) Schools and school routes should be incorporated into patrol routes to enhance the protection of these most vulnerable members of society.

- ◆ **Night Patrols:** The hours of darkness are a preferred operational window for criminals and individuals intent on doing harm. Patrolling activities must be conducted during periods of limited visibility, and should be a mixture of both overt, or “lighted,” presence patrols and covert patrols. Overt presence patrols can be conducted in conjunction with local community watch teams to provide a deterrent against criminal activity. Conventional night patrols conducted along primary avenues of approach, communities and camps serve to disrupt belligerent activity and enhance early warning, especially when incorporated with listening posts.
- ◆ **Random Patrols and Checkpoints:** While some of the patrols mentioned above are inherently predictable, the patrol schedules established by peacekeepers should include random patrols that venture into areas templated to harbor criminal and belligerents. These patrols must be prepared to decisively engage in accordance with their established Rules of Engagement. Fixed and random checkpoints should be incorporated into patrols to monitor access to vulnerable areas.
- ◆ **Protected Area SGBV Patrols:** Protected areas are at risk for sexual and gender based violence. In addition to security measures designed to keep belligerents out of the protected areas, patrols and outreach should be conducted within the protected areas specifically designed to prevent internal SGBV conducted by protected area residents against protected area residents.



UN Photo by Gonzalez Farran

time the combined effect of such operations can improve an at risk population's security, reduce the peacekeepers' scale and intensity of security operations, and deny belligerents easy opportunities to commit violence against civilians. When reinforced by the rehabilitation of critical infrastructure and institutions, the effects can, over time, create the conditions that will promote longer term community growth and stability. Community benefit tactics are varied and frequently require relatively few resources to achieve significant results. (United Nations, 2010)

### ***Community Benefit Tactics***

Community benefit tactics directly improve the well-being of a community and directly enhance the protection of civilians. The provision of tools, seed, fertilizer, and irrigation wells through Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) projects can support the planting of crops near villages, in turn reducing the need, and the risk exposure, to travel in order to gather food. The provision of multi-fuel stoves, for example through the NGO Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves, may reduce dependence on firewood with a concomitant reduced need to travel long distances to support cooking. Similarly, the drilling of a water well can significantly shorten the distance a village must go to obtain water. Other examples, for instance medical care visits, can also contribute to the well-being and the security of a populace. Over

Communities subjected to or recovering from conflict usually have a diminished infrastructure and medical capacity. MED-CAPS can provide crucial medical care and can be incorporated into JPTs, CIMIC activities, or conducted as standalone activities. Military treatment facilities on bases can designate certain periods of time to treat civilians and medical professionals. Both peacekeepers and NGOs can provide training, assistance, and equipment to local medical personnel. Programs designed to rehabilitate critical infrastructure such as electricity, sanitation, and water – regardless of how rudimentary – can have a significant impact on the community. The establishment of infrastructures that support a population can be organized along the SWEAT-M model: sanitation, water, energy, academics, transportation, and medical services.

### **Information Operations Tactics**

Information Operations (IO) tactics rely on outreach, public affairs, and civil military operations, but must have the complete involvement of the commander to be successful. Impartiality and transparency are cornerstones of PO. Information operations support the command by affirming to the population messages and themes that peacekeeping forces are in the area to accomplish the following:

- *Protect the population from violence, intimidation, coercion, and reprisals;*
- *Monitor, enforce, and establish a peaceful environment, through force if required;*
- *Improve essential services where possible; and,*
- *Support the rule of law.*

These themes and messages, and others nested with higher level guidance, should consistently be reinforced through a variety of channels to include: direct interaction with the community, public announcements, meetings with leaders, and informational literature. Actors with a stake in undermining peace will take full advantage of missteps to discredit the peacekeeping force and its mission, and IO can offset their negative influences.

### **Trust and Confidence**

Protecting civilians who neither trust you nor have confidence in your abilities is difficult. Building trust and confidence with the population is critical to mission success, but requires deliberate and continuing interaction with the population. Establishing liaison with community leaders, former belligerents, and key stake holders to identify their concerns and immediate problems, and working with them to develop solutions, demonstrates willingness to engage in creating solutions that meet the needs of legitimate stakeholders. Care must be taken to not overpromise and to manage expectations when conducting meetings and negotiations. Issues and concerns that are raised must be staffed and analyzed to confirm the facts and to develop courses of action that are effective, suitable, and feasible. Identification and the mitigation or elimination of root causes of problems, when possible, should be a primary aim of trust and confidence missions.

### **SWEAT-M Training**

*Programs designed to rehabilitate critical infrastructure such as electricity, sanitation, and water - regardless of how rudimentary – can have a significant impact on the community. The establishment of infrastructures that support a population can be organized along the SWEAT-M model:*

- *Sanitation*
- *Water*
- *Energy*
- *Academics*
- *Transportation*
- *Medical services*

## Themes

Direct coordination with local leaders and thorough intelligence preparation will identify specific audiences for targeted IO. Reducing criminality, reducing violence against women and children, and promoting basic human rights should be continuing themes of any information operation conducted. Programs that reduce unemployment through vocational skills training or temporary work programs may reduce criminality and SGBV acts. Addressing public health concerns to include women's health, well baby clinics, and preventative health programs improve well being and establish a meaningful dialogue with the population that is essential to gaining trust and confidence.

Elections are high visibility and particularly susceptible to acts of violence and intimidation. Units should develop comprehensive election support plans well in advance to ensure a secure election environment in close cooperation with the election commission. Election support plans should include security measures, freedom of movement to and from polling places, voter registration, and publication of election results.

### ***Common Tactical Tasks***

Protecting civilians requires that soldiers be proficient in basic soldier skills and common tactical tasks. The ACOTA program has a well developed model for training units on common tactical tasks in support of PO (Annex IV). Skills that require proficiency include: marksmanship, weapons maintenance, individual movement techniques, basic survival skills, first aid, mounted and dismounted patrolling and urban operations. Additionally, soldiers should be trained in basic tactical questioning, reporting information, use of force and the Rules of Engagement applicable to their Area of Operations. Soldiers should be trained on the application of the Soldier Response Card (Annex III, Figure 3) that provides guidance on immediate actions a soldier should take if they observe a criminal or violent act. The card informs the soldier what to do to prevent the act and safeguard civilians during the incident by outlining basic, post event actions based on ten possible scenarios. These scenarios include criminality, collateral injuries, rape, trafficking in persons, torture, deprivation, forced displacement, violence against women and children, systematic violence, and genocide. All peacekeepers should understand how to recognize the indicators of these scenarios, and how to appropriately respond.

### ***POC Planning, Training and Exercise Scenarios:***

- *Criminality*
- *Collateral injuries*
- *Rape*
- *Trafficking in Persons*
- *Torture*
- *Deprivation*
- *Forced displacement*
- *Violence against Women and Children*
- *Systematic violence*
- *Genocide*

### **Staff Training**

The primary function of a staff is to support the commander's decision making process. The staff provides relevant information and analysis, makes estimates and recommendations, prepares plans and orders, and monitors execution of operations in support of the decision making process. (United States Army, 2003) Additional and essential functions of the staff include assisting subordinate units and keeping higher, lower, and adjacent units informed. Effective Protection of Civilians is dependent upon a well trained staff that can execute these functions. A staff produces information and analysis, prepares and disseminates plans, and staff sections control their specific area of expertise.

ACOTA trains staffs during the Command and Staff Opera-



tional Skills (CSOS) course. This course consists of ten training days of instruction in the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) as well as instruction on command and staff procedures in peace support operations. To enable the staff to better support the commander within the context of protecting civilians, CSOS instruction should include considerations specifically tailored for incorporating Protection of Civilians within the MDMP, with the ten POC scenarios (Annex II) integrated into all aspects of planning, training, exercises, and operations.

## Protection of Civilians Considerations for the MDMP

Planning is conducted at all levels and is an iterative process that relies on knowledge, judgment, clarity, and thoroughness. Design Methodology, MDMP, and Troop Leading Procedures are conceptual and analytical planning tools that assist commanders, leaders, and staffs at all levels in solving problems. A design based structured inquiry that contextually analyzes the environment and the problem enables leaders at all levels to develop POC concepts and planning guidance that shape the problem solving approach. (United States Army, 2010)<sup>ii</sup>

### *Frame the Environment*

Situational understanding to effectively plan and conduct operations is gained from framing the operational environment. Intelligence fusion, the combination, analysis, and synthesis of information from all sources and all stakeholders into a coherent intelligence picture, is a key component of framing the environment. The fusion process is continuous, always providing the commander and staff a cogent and comprehensive understanding of what has occurred, why it occurred, and what may occur in the future.

It is important for the commander and staff to have an appreciation of how the current situation is shaped by history, culture, and the goals of actors in the operational environment. This assists the commander in predicting what might occur in the future and the effects of potential actions within the operational environment. Framing the environment allows commanders to make assumptions based on understanding of actors and their relationships. This process is evolutionary, incorporating new facts and insights throughout the iterative planning process. Commanders must overlay the understanding of the environment on existing guidance, mandates, and country caveats to properly understand existing conditions and determine the desired end state. This process also allows commanders to understand the goals and amount of influence key actors exert within the operating environment. Understanding the patterns, trends, interactions and relationships of various actors, the commander and staff can develop a desired end state shaped by the environmental context and higher authority's guidance. (United States Army, 2010)



UN Photo by Eric Kanalstein

### Understand the Context of Higher Authority Guidance and Direction

US planning doctrine requires units to have a clear understanding of the mission and intent of headquarters



UN Photo

leadership for such operations.” (Holt V. K., *The Responsibility to Protect: Considering the Operational Capacity for Civilian Protection*, 2005)

Differences in interpretation of a mandate’s language can prevent common understanding. For example, the MONUSCO mandate “*emphasizes* that the protection of civilians must be given priority in decisions about the use of available capacity and resources and *authorizes* MONUSCO to use all necessary means, within the limits of its capacity and in the areas where its units are deployed, to carry out its protection mandate.” (United Nations Security Council, 2010) It goes on to direct forces to “Ensure the effective protection of civilians, including humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders, under imminent threat of physical violence, in particular violence emanating from any of the parties engaged in the conflict.” (United Nations Security Council, 2010) The MONUSCO mandate is clear that protection of civilians be given priority regarding the use of available capacity and resources. The caveat “available,” however, begs the question regarding who determines availability. Likewise, the phrase “areas where units are deployed” can be interpreted several ways. Does it mean within the Area of Operations, or does it mean where units are physically located at a specific point in time? Additionally, “under imminent threat of physical violence” may determine how proactive a unit can be towards ensuring effective protection, and may limit the unit to reactive measures based on the definition of an “imminent threat.” While this might appear to be mere semantics, it is extremely important for the unit commander and his staff to be in complete alignment with the UN Force Commander, the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), and caveats directed by the unit’s national leadership.

## Understand the Context of Culture, Geography, Actors, History and Relationships

Gaining a thorough appreciation of the factors that comprise a geographic area is essential to framing the environment. Units gain an understanding of the culture by conducting analysis of the customs, institutions,

two levels up. (United States Army, 2010) This understanding of what a unit has been directed to accomplish ensures alignment of headquarters and facilitates working towards a common goal. However, understanding the context of the guidance and direction regarding POC can itself be an iterative process. “Even when the UN includes civilian protection in its Council resolutions, additional factors – actual capacity, perceived capacity and location – determine whether it is carried out. While one phrase in UN mandates recurs, ‘protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence,’ it is highly likely that interpretation of this language varies in practice, as does the preparation of peacekeepers, commanders, and the political



and achievements of the various ethnic groups within the Area of Interest (AI). Units should identify if there is an overarching national culture or multiple sub-cultures based on ethnicity, tribal, or religious divisions and understand the differences and similarities between these cultures. Cultural understanding includes deep knowledge of national and religious holidays, livestock and crop market cycles, political systems and celebrations. (United States Army, 2006)

### ***Frame the Problem***

The challenges of civil security encompass many different patterns of attacks on civilians. It includes everything from isolated criminal acts against an individual to mass killing. The cumulative effect of campaigns of targeted violence may result in a large number of victims from sexual violence, torture, mutilation, and killing, all contributing to widespread terror. Politics and ideology are not always the motivators for this violence. In many Areas of Operation, the distinction between criminal and political violence is blurred and the motivations are varied. (Kelly, 2010) Protecting civilians in this complex environment is challenging. Solving the problem begins with understanding the motivating factors behind the various breaches of civil security.

The commander and his staff must isolate and define the root causes of conflict by identifying the tension, competition, opportunities, and challenges that exist between actors within the Area of Operations. Defining this complex problem requires refining the initial assessment of disposition and potential while identifying competition, opportunities, and challenges among the existing conditions and the desired end state. (United States Army, 2010) Identification of the root causes of the conflict gives the commander and staff insight into what has happened previously, and what possibilities for conflict may exist. Threats against the humane treatment and security of non-combatants can be random and opportunistic, or planned and methodical. It is essential that the commander and staff understand the historic and current patterns and scale of violence within the Area of Interest, as well as the underlying causes, in order to prevent future incidents.

Analysis of the difference between existing and desired conditions allows the staff to identify the positive, neutral, and negative implications of tension between actors within the operational environment. Any action taken within the operational environment may exacerbate, or reduce, tensions that can be exploited to drive change. If not controlled, tensions may undermine the creation of desired conditions. Because differences in perceptions, goals, and capabilities among relevant actors create tension, it can both foster and impede change. Developing a plan that will solve the problem starts with deciding how to address the tension. (United States Army, 2010)

### ***Consider Approaches to Solve the Problem***

The peacekeeping commander and staff should be trained on approaches to solving the problems they are presented to accomplish their assigned mission. This includes developing the



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end state; identifying centers of gravity and associated critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities; determining lines of effort; identifying operational phases; identifying suitable tasks to solve the problem; developing Flexible Deterrent Options; and considering those key tasks that will facilitate the Protection of Civilians.

## Develop End State

The first step to solving the problem is visualizing what the successful end will look like. This visualization can be expressed in terms of civilian population, belligerents, geography, governmental institutions, friendly forces, and other factors. The end state is a set of future conditions that, if achieved, accomplish the mission by meeting the objectives of mandates, policy, orders, guidance, and directives issued to the commander. (United States Army, 2010) The staff assists the commander in developing the desired conditions that comprise the end state. Because conditions vary based on the environment, culture, and mission, within the context of civilian protection conditions may be tangible or intangible, focused on belligerents, communities, or the civilians themselves. They can focus on physical or psychological aspects of POC or describe perceptions, levels of mutual comprehension, cohesion, or type of interactions among groups. (United States Army, 2010) Conditions and end state must be aligned with higher mandates, policy, orders, guidance, and directives.

## Center Of Gravity

Solving the problem requires identifying the Center(s) of Gravity (COG). A COG is the set of characteristics, capabilities, and sources of power from which an actor derives its moral or physical strength, freedom of action, and will to act. (Department of Defense, 2006) COG analysis helps the commander and staff identify the primary capability that allows a force to accomplish its objectives. Identifying the COG for both friendly and belligerent actors is vital to developing a successful plan because it allows the commander and staff to focus their efforts on neutralizing or defeating belligerent COGs and defending friendly COGs.

COG analysis is a methodical process that begins with determining the belligerent(s) critical capability, or the essential function the belligerent performs. Once the critical capability is isolated, the system or source of power that has the inherent ability to accomplish the critical capability is identified. This source of power is the Center of Gravity. Once the source of power (COG) is identified the commander and staff must determine the critical requirements for the **COG** to function. Once those critical requirements have been identified, the staff must analyze each requirement to determine which requirement is vulnerable. The vulnerabilities then become the focus or targets of future plans designed to solve the problem. A simple method of validating a center of gravity is the “does/use” test. If a system or source of power does the actual work that generates the critical capability it is a center of gravity. Anything that the system or source uses to achieve the critical capability is a requirement. (Eikmeier, 2004)

## Lines of Effort

Lines of effort link multiple missions and tasks using cause and effect to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions. Lines of effort are important planning tools in PO when positional references to a belligerent have little relevance. In operations involving many nonmilitary factors, lines of effort are a practical way to link tasks, effects, conditions, and the desired end state. They are a particularly valuable tool when used to achieve unity of effort in operations involving multinational forces and civilian

organizations, where unity of command is not always clear. (United States Army, 2008) This planning tool is particularly useful in PO, where numerous stakeholders from diverse communities are seeking to contribute to a unified effort.

Lines of effort can help describe how operations create intangible end state conditions and depict how individual actions relate to each other and to achieving the end state. Ideally, lines of effort combine long-term effects of PO tasks with the



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cyclic, short-term events of more conventional tactical tasks. PO tasks can also be depicted in relation to broader interagency efforts to develop a broader understanding of actions occurring within the AO. Typical lines of effort for a PO include: Governance, Information, Security, Economic, Infrastructure, and Population.

### *Governance*

The governance line of effort is focused on those actions that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions to avoid renewal of conflict. Good governance is normally a key requirement to achieve legitimacy for the Host Nation (HN) government and without it, the peace may fail. Leaders at all levels should be able to work with various levels of local government to facilitate basic levels of support and establish rule of law. Leaders of peacekeeping forces are expected to convey strategic communications themes and messages throughout their Area of Operations in support of diplomatic efforts for long-term political settlement.

Sometimes no HN government exists, or the government is unable or unwilling to assume full responsibility for governance. In those cases, this line of effort may involve establishing and maintaining a civil administration while the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General (UNSRSG) works at the diplomatic level creating and organizing a HN capability to govern. Developing better governance will potentially affect the lives of the populace more than any other PO. When well executed, these actions may eliminate the root causes that led to conflict. Governance activities are among the most important in establishing lasting Protection of Civilians.

U.S. Army *Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations* lists several considerations for developing governance that apply to PO, including:

- If no local government exists, encourage respected community leaders to create one until a more permanent one can be established;
- Work through the UNSRSG diplomatic channels to encourage the host government to remove or reduce genuine grievances, expose imaginary ones, and resolve contradictions;
- Help the host government develop and empower competent and responsive leaders and strengthen their civil service and security forces;
- Be accessible to facilitate communication;
- Encourage the government to concede local demands that might be a source of conflict or source of power for belligerents;
- Emphasize the national perspective and downplay sectarian differences;
- Establish a system for citizens to gain redress for perceived wrongs by government authorities and PO forces;
- Enhance existing capabilities.



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### Information

The information line of effort sets conditions for the success of all other lines of effort. Publicizing government policies, the actual situation, and PO force accomplishments the information line of effort, synchronized with public affairs, can neutralize belligerent propaganda and false claims. Information Operations must be aligned and support the interagency strategic communications operation, as well as being coordinated and synchronized with the other lines of effort. Every member of the PO force is an integral part of the information line of operations effort. Information Operations should be executed continually through the actions of professional and alert PO forces working among the populace.

When effectively used, Information Operations address the root causes of conflict that belligerents use to gain support. Information Operations should be tailored to address the concerns of the populace of specific areas and inform the public of successfully completed projects and improvements, including accomplishments in security, infrastructure, essential services, and economic development. Engaging the local populace and stakeholders through face-to-face engagements, village meetings, and community events gives commanders additional opportunities to assess the effects of IO, address community issues and concerns, and personally communicate messages and dispel misinformation. (United States Army, 2006)

Information Operations should be based on fact and accomplishments. Basing IO on future plans or concepts may result in broken promises that disrupt the peace process. Themes and messages based on policy should be distributed as soon as possible using all available means. Information operations should be impartial and PO forces should avoid choosing sides whenever possible. Favoritism, real or perceived, can



exacerbate problems and make PO forces and those groups they are perceived to be favoring more desirable targets for belligerents. (United States Army, 2006)

Commanders should work directly with the media and communicate command themes and messages personally. Media coverage influences the perceptions of the political leaders and public of the host nation and the international community, which can influence the outcome of the peace process.

## Security

This line of operation establishes and maintains measures to protect people and infrastructure from hostile acts or influences while neutralizing belligerents. If the mandate specifies Protection of Civilians, this line of effort may become the decisive line of effort. Belligerents use unlawful violence to weaken the HN government, intimidate people into passive or active support, and murder those who oppose their agenda.


Protecting civilians sometimes requires measured combat operations to address belligerents who cannot be co-opted or compelled into operating within the rule of law. These operations may sometimes require overwhelming force and the killing of belligerents. However, because peace operations are conducted within the populace, combat operations must be executed with an appropriate level of restraint to avoid injuring non-combatants and damaging property. Not only is there a moral basis for the use of restraint or measured force; there are practical reasons as well. Needlessly harming innocents can turn the populace against the peace effort. (United States Army, 2006)

PO forces need to be with the people to protect and secure them. Community protection tactics, community presence tactics, and threat oriented tactics outlined previously under Protection of Civilians TTP best accomplish the Security line of effort.

Most societal and government functions require a secure environment. Although PO forces can provide direct assistance to establish and maintain security, this is a temporary solution. Ultimately, the host nation must secure its own people. The PO force can help the host nation develop the forces required to establish and maintain stability within its borders. This task usually involves other government agencies and multinational partners. This assistance can include developing, equipping, training, and employing host nation security forces. It may extend to operations in which PO forces work alongside the newly formed, expanded, or reformed host nation forces. (United States Army, 2006)

## Economic

The economic line of effort includes activities designed to enhance the production, consumption, and distribution of goods and services. Efforts should be balanced between short and long term programs based on assessments of the AI, strategic aims, and existing capabilities. The economic health of a society is linked to the rule of law and security situation, which requires coordination of this line of effort with the governance and security lines of effort. Activities can range from the reha-



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bilitation of a local market to the development of a manufacturing center. The culture, capabilities, and resources available will determine the type of economic development that can be successfully pursued. Areas where the existing economy is based on subsistence and barter require different recovery programs from those based on manufacturing and services. Care must be taken to not become solely focused on short term, quick fix economic development at the expense of sustainable long term growth.

Often, the security environment improves with the economic environment. High levels of unemployment, poverty, and black markets encourage criminal activity and create strife and dissent that favor belligerents' agendas. Tailored development programs that actively employ the population while enhancing economic well being assist in creating a safe and secure environment. However, economic development programs and communities that benefit from them may become targets of belligerents.



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initiated within this line of effort must take a systems approach to have long term success. The construction of new clinics and schools must include the staffing of medical professionals and teachers equipped with medicine and school supplies.

This line of effort requires close coordination with the host nation and other supporting agencies to develop sustainable long term strategies. In instances where the situation does not permit host nation or external support, or the host nation is unwilling or incapable of providing services, the PO force may have to perform these tasks for an extended period.

PO forces should establish achievable goals that enable the community or host nation to assume responsibility for these services. Establishing unsustainable or unnecessary activities will be counterproductive. Information operations are nested in this line of effort to manage expectations and ensure that the public understands the problems involved in providing these services. This line of effort should become a partnership between PO forces and local authorities using as much local leadership, talent, and labor as possible. PO forces should conduct macro and micro assessments to determine what can be accomplished at the national level (macro) and what needs to be accomplished at the local level (micro). Local preference should

### *Infrastructure and Essential Services*

Infrastructure and essential services are the basic life support requirements normally provided by a community or government and the need for infrastructure increases based on the level of urbanization and population density. At a minimum level, this line of effort should ensure access to fresh water, medical care, and sanitation measures that prevent the outbreak of communicable diseases. Energy requirements can vary from firewood for cooking and heating in rural areas to electricity and natural gas in urban areas. Similarly, transportation requirements include access to safe paths and roads in rural areas to mass transit in urban areas. Academic programs benefit the long term well being of communities and enhance the welfare of children. Projects

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*Sanitation*  
*Water*  
*Energy*  
*Academics*  
*Transportation*  
*Medical*

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be taken into consideration and cultural sensitivity incorporated into the assessment to ensure that the project is desired by the populace. Realistic and measurable goals should be established and metrics developed to manage them. Peacekeeping unit commanders should encourage participation of NGOs while maintaining an appreciation that many NGOs do not want to be perceived as being associated with military forces. (United States Army, 2006)

### *Population*

Capturing the will of the people involves establishing legitimacy with the local population. In developing plans that ultimately win the peace, PO forces must develop meaningful relationships with the local community. These relationships can serve as conduits for themes and messages as well as providing venues for information gathering regarding threats they face, actions they have taken to reduce those threats, and their perspective on ongoing operations. (Kelly, 2010) The population line of effort is similar to the information line of effort in that it is inextricably tied to the other lines of effort. The population and information lines of effort can be visualized as a framework that supports the other lines of effort. Clergy, village elders, government officials, professionals, former belligerent leaders, and other individuals who have influence with segments of the population must be identified and continually engaged. These engagements must be planned and synchronized with the other lines of effort to develop synergy.



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### *Phased Operations*

A *phase* divides an operation in duration or activity. Changes in mission, objective, or task organization are examples of events that cause a change in phase. Phases facilitate control, focus effort, and synchronize effects in time and space in a deliberate and logical manner. (United States Army, 2010) The phases described below are applicable to units deploying at the beginning of a PO, units deploying as part of an established PO, or units developing contingency plans during the conduct of PO.

#### *Intelligence and Shaping Phase*

This phase involves developing an understanding of belligerents and potential adversaries through the analysis of information and knowledge obtained through observation, research and investigation and using that understanding to create favorable conditions. The phase begins with receipt or anticipation of a mission. This phase is an extension of environmental framing and forms the basis for subsequent phases.

#### *Seize Initiative*

Seizing the initiative involves those actions that set conditions for favorable actions throughout the operation, including proactively establishing a presence in the AO and making it clear to all parties that the PO force will impartially enforce the provisions of the mandate. Actions include immediate initiation of TTP across designated lines of effort in support of mission objectives. These can include a full range of



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phasis on the information, security, and population lines and draws heavily on information operations, community presence, community protection, and community benefit tactics.

### *Stabilize*

The stabilization phase is designed to consolidate gains made in the previous phases and strengthen existing environmental conditions, practices, and government/community institutions that support peaceful accomplishment of mission mandates and a safe and secure environment. It involves normalizing relations with key stakeholders and strengthening trust and confidence in mission objectives. This phase places an emphasis on the information, security, and population lines of effort. Information operations, presence, protection, and benefit tactics will be most commonly utilized.

### *Support and Enable Civil Authority*

This phase will have the longest duration and should become the status quo. However, newly arrived forces being integrated into an existing operation must plan to execute the preceding phases in conjunction with this phase, regardless of gains made by previous forces, to set the conditions for successful continuance of this phase. The governance, economic and essential services lines of effort will vie for dominance during the phase with information, security, and population lines serving as supporting efforts. Forces involved in POC operations will primarily employ benefit, presence, and protection tactics during this phase.

### *Adaptive Planning Options<sup>iii</sup>*

Crisis can arise under a variety of circumstances that will, in turn, elicit a variety of likely responses. Adaptive planning provides response options, which can be adapted to the crisis confronting the force. Ideally, the crisis can be resolved without direct conflict but the force should be prepared to escalate its response

information operations, community presence, and community protection tactics to include establishing bases, conducting reconnaissance, initiating patrols, and establishing liaison with community leaders.

### *Influence*

This phase is designed to overcome the resistance of individuals or groups to protection objectives, the mission mandate, or specific operational objectives. Influencing causes targeted individuals and organizations to act in a manner that is favorable to the PO force and supports the desired end state of the mission or specific operation through leadership, participation, facilitation, co-optation, and coercion. This phase works across all lines of effort with em-



until the desired outcome is achieved. Adaptive planning options are only effective when the commander and staff have situational understanding and awareness that is informed by robust intelligence collection and analysis mechanism. Triggers must be determined to properly refine and execute these plans in a timely manner in order to preempt a more severe crisis that may require a proportionally larger and violent response. Adaptive planning is a continuous, proactive process of the staff battle rhythm, with the aim of developing crisis action plans prior to the crisis developing.

It is essential to resolve a crisis quickly with the minimum force required. Communications through all available information operations channels, with specific emphasis on direct leader engagement is an effective component of crisis resolution. When entering into preemptive engagements to resolve the crisis the leader, liaison, or representative delivering the message must be consistent, constant, credible, concise and clear. The themes and messages must be consistent with guidance and support crisis resolution efforts.

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### ***Communicating To Threats***

- ***Consistent***
- ***Constant***
- ***Credible***
- ***Concise***
- ***Clear***

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### ***Co-Opt***

The preferred solution is to co-opt the belligerent party. Developing relationships with key belligerents and giving them prominent roles in the reconciliation process may create a vested interest in furthering a successful and lasting peace. This vested interest on the part of the belligerent may place the risk of personal failure above ideological aims and foster personal investment in an outcome to avoid public loss of face. Over time, the influence of the belligerent leader will facilitate assimilating his or her followers into the larger community. This method requires a deep understanding of the personalities and motivations of individuals and groups targeted for co-optation and adept engagement.

### ***Pacify***

Pacification requires a conciliatory effort to satisfy an individual or group. Facilitating or entering into direct negotiations with a clear understanding of friction points, potentials of actors and concessions that would be amenable to all parties can resolve a crisis before it becomes violent.

### ***Deter***

Presenting a credible threat of an unacceptable response to an anticipated or proposed belligerent action will discourage that action. (Department of Defense, 2010) Deterrence is based on the premise that the pain is not worth the gain. Often associated with threat oriented military tactics, diplomatic and economic measures are frequently also used to deter. Deterrence is only effective if the force signaling the response has the capability, the opportunity, and the will to follow through with its threat. Deterrence is best communicated through a known or demonstrated capability rather than bellicose rhetoric. Units considering deterrence must be prepared to follow through in the event the belligerent is not deterred.

### ***Neutralize***

The aim of neutralization is to prevent an individual or group from interfering with a planned action or operation. (Department of Defense, 2010) Targeting a critical vulnerability of a belligerent center of gravity



can render it incapable of action. This may include kinetic or non-kinetic delivery, dependent on the targeted vulnerability. Adaptive planning options, above, can all be used to neutralize.



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in order to allow PO forces time to accomplish a planned action or respond to the hostile action. In the initial stages of a mass atrocity or genocide, particularly in areas where PO forces are dispersed across a broad geographic area, a smaller force might engage the belligerent force to gain time for a larger PO force to respond. Additionally, forcing the belligerent's diversion of forces and attention to such an action will lessen the intensity of execution of the atrocity.

### *Deny*

Preventing belligerent forces from using terrain, space, personnel, supplies, or facilities (United States Army, 2004) is a task frequently utilized in PO. Protection patrols, forward basing, and protected areas are examples of TTPs that can achieve a deny effect.

### *Defeat*

When a force loses the physical means or the will to fight and can no longer significantly interfere with the actions of friendly forces it has been defeated. (United States Army, 2004) Similar to deter, defeat can sometimes be achieved through a threat of action, vice actual action. While often associated with kinetic operations, all lines of effort can result in the defeat of belligerent actors. In environments where belligerents draw their support from the population, non-kinetic lines of effort are most effective at defeating belligerent groups.

### *Rehabilitate*

Successful co-optation, pacification, neutralization, deterrence, or defeat will require significant rehabilitation efforts to prevent a future return of the belligerent to force. Plans must be developed to rehabilitate former belligerents and reintegrate them into society. PO forces must be sensitive to long-standing differ-

### *Preempt*

Preemption involves acting first to negate the planned action of the belligerent party. It involves a wide range of activities, including information operations tactics, community protection tactics, and threat oriented tactics. These, and others, may be used in combination or individually to preempt a belligerent action. For preemption to be successful, the preempting force must know of the impending belligerent action.

### *Delay*

Trading space or action for time is the essence of delay. (United States Army, 2001) The purpose of delaying is to impede the progress or cause a hostile action to occur later than the hostile party intended

ences and grudges during this process. International agencies and non-governmental organizations can provide expertise and guidance during rehabilitation efforts.

## Flexible Deterrent Options<sup>iv</sup>

A Flexible Deterrent Option (FDO) is a planning construct that is intended to facilitate early decision making by developing a wide range of interrelated responses that begin with deterrent-oriented actions carefully tailored to produce a desired effect. The FDO is the means by which the various diplomatic, information, military, and economic deterrent measures available are included in the planning process. (Department of Defense, 2010) FDOs are coercive measures that increase in intensity of effect until the desired outcome is achieved. They convey a strong message to belligerent parties of intent and capability in support of preventative engagement while pre-positioning instruments of power for additional, more robust action in the event that deterrence is not achieved.

## Preventative Engagement

Preventative engagement should be initiated at the first indication a belligerent is considering activities that would disrupt the peace process and endanger civilians. The purpose of preventative engagement is to forestall undesired belligerent activity by increasing mutual understanding and presenting a series of settlement options designed to co-opt, pacify, or neutralize the belligerent's intent through a graduated engagement strategy that shapes the belligerent's deliberations while still in their formative stages.

The leader conducting the engagement should be empathetic towards the belligerent party while attempting to understand their motives and goals. This is a fundamental aspect of the engagement as it informs and shapes the conversation and sets the agenda for possible options addressing resolution.

Building rapport by identifying areas of commonality and agreement can diffuse tension and create a positive environment that increases the likelihood of the belligerent accepting incentives to change behaviors.

Prior to the engagement, the staff should develop a range of tailored incentives that would be agreeable to the belligerent in return for specific quid pro quo concessions desired by the peacekeeping commander. These incentives are based on detailed analysis of the belligerent's motivations, objectives, and key personalities. The belligerent may have justified grievances that if alleviated would benefit all parties.

In addition to working with the belligerent to develop mutually agreeable solutions, the peacekeeping commander or representative should offer cautionary counsel explaining the second and third order effects of specific undesired behaviors and the range of consequences that the international community, host nation, and PO force are prepared to inflict if the belligerent's current or planned actions are not acceptable.

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## Preventive Engagement

- *Empathize to elicit and understand motives and goals*
  - *Seek shared agreement to build rapport*
  - *Offer targeted incentives for specific behaviors*
  - *Recognize and offer quid pro quo support for assisting with legitimate grievances*
  - *Offer cautionary counsel to neutralize agendas*
-

## *Overt Surveillance*

Overt surveillance should be initiated at the first sign of a belligerent's undesired behavior. In addition to providing real time information on hostile actor activity and intentions, it sends a clear message to the hostile actor that they are being targeted. The optimal effect is to deter the belligerent. Giving the belligerent an opportunity to clearly realize that assets are in place to report and document his activities may have a powerful deterrent effect. The witness aspect of overt surveillance is enabled by sharing information gathered with the media and international organizations, potentially resulting in additional scrutiny and pressure being placed on the belligerent parties. This can alter the belligerent's decision cycle through cultivation of the fears of his future personal criminal prosecution in international venues, the potential loss of his popular support if his activities were to be carried through, and his personal risk of and vulnerability to retaliation. (Sewall, Raymond, & Chin, 2010)

## *Predeployment/Deployment Activities*

Isolating the hostile actors from their habitual support systems and posturing PO forces for additional measures are part of pre-deployment and deployment activities. This includes forces already participating in PO moving into an area of operations and forces preparing to deploy in support of a PO. These activities alter the balance of military power in a region or specific area and signal a threat to belligerent actors that the PO force is prepared to act if behavior is not modified.



UN Photo by Martine Pettet

PO force to negotiate from a position of strength.

## *Show of Force*

Similar to deployment activities, a show of force demonstrates to belligerents the capability and intent of the PO force to take decisive action if required. This coercive measure increases the intensity of the warnings issued to belligerents and can position forces for subsequent actions if the belligerent is not dissuaded.

## *Strikes and Raids*

If preemptive engagement and force posturing activities fail to resolve the situation, limited offensive operations against specific targets should be considered. Strikes and raids against carefully selected high payoff targets that disable critical belligerent capabilities send a clear message to belligerents and enable the

## *Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response Operations (MAPRO)*

MAPRO are contingency operations designed to intervene and mitigate or halt mass atrocities. These are complex operations involving multiparty politics, compressed timelines, high stakes, asymmetric escalatory dynamics, and vague intelligence. (Sewall, Raymond, & Chin, 2010) If the effect of the belligerent's activity is anticipated to reach the level of a mass atrocity and FDOs fail to achieve deterrence, the PO forces in



the area should be prepared to receive a change of mission and serve as the in-place force for a MAPRO, providing an immediate military response in conjunction with other elements of power.

## Key POC Tasks

Successfully protecting civilians during the conduct of PO involves several key tasks<sup>v</sup> that directly and indirectly prevent harm by facilitating a safe and secure environment. These tasks are not an exhaustive listing, but include those military tasks that will contribute to achieving the protection mandate.

### *Develop Situational Understanding*

Determining the relationship between your mission, the environment, your organization, the threats, and the civilian population through iterative analytical assessment leads to situational understanding. Developing situational understanding is not a task relegated to the staff but involves every member of the organization.

### *Establish and Maintain Presence in the AO*

Forces participating in PO must see and be seen. A disciplined force that is able to maintain a visible presence throughout the area of operations builds confidence and trust with the population that is critical in establishing order. It also has a strong deterrent effect with criminal and belligerent elements and allows for rapid response times in the event that military action is required.



UN Photo by Martine Perret

### *Physically Occupy Key Terrain*

Whether conducting operations in rural or urban areas, a PO force must physically occupy key terrain to establish control and maintain observation. The amount of control exerted is always conditional based on the situation, but can best be accomplished when key terrain is occupied.

### *Secure Key Sites*

Every locale will have some form of key site that will require security. These could be areas that are culturally or historically significant, war crimes sites, religious facilities, or schools. The designation of a site as key can be permanent or temporary. For example, a voting place would be a key site during an election, but not necessarily afterwards. (Air Land Sea Application Center, 2009)

### *Control Borders*

The regulation of people and material across borders is fundamental to providing security and assistance in peacekeeping environments. Borders must be controlled and commanders must clearly identify the permitted or prohibited individuals, groups, units, or material that can cross the border. Units should consider



ground, maritime, and air assets, as available, when planning border security in a peacekeeping security environment. (Air Land Sea Application Center, 2009)

### ***Separate Belligerent Actors***

Belligerents may require physical separation if they both physically control territory. There are a number of measures that can be implemented, including demilitarized zones, buffer zones, zones of separation, and demarcation lines. These delineating features must be easily recognizable and preferably agreed to and emplaced by the belligerents and verified with global positioning systems. Once physical separation is accomplished, it must be enforced with patrols and observation points. In some situations, such as a post insurgency environment, geographic separation may not be feasible. In very unique circumstances, specific individuals may be designated for separation. These individuals could be divisive or polarizing factional leaders or persons indicted for war crimes. (Air Land Sea Application Center, 2009)

### ***Establish Population Centric Control Measures***

Control measures must be clearly known and understood by the local population. They must be visible in all weather and light conditions and routinely maintained. Peacekeeping units should include control measure review procedures as part of their routine interaction with locals. (Air Land Sea Application Center, 2009)

### ***Ensure Freedom of Movement***

PO forces must ensure freedom of movement for themselves. If freedom of movement is lost, so is initiative, with the effect that the PO force is marginalized. There should be no restrictions on the PO force, the civilian population, or humanitarian access. (Air Land Sea Application Center, 2009)

### ***Establish Secure Base(s)***

PO forces must have secure bases from which they conduct operations. Not all bases will be located in fully permissive environments, and units must conduct deliberate intelligence preparation and planning before making any basing decisions. Bases must be continually assessed and improved as part of the base security plan. (Air Land Sea Application Center, 2009)

### ***Ensure Public Security***

The PO force is obligated to ensure that public security is maintained, regardless of who carries out the tasks. Public security tasks include demining, crowd control, curfew enforcement, and securing those key sites and facilities that are frequented by civilians. (Air Land Sea Application Center, 2009)

### ***Individual Training***

The success of the unit is contingent upon the quality of the individual. The training of the “strategic corporal” is just as important as the training of the peacekeeping force commander. All members of units deploying for PO must have a baseline understanding and level of proficiency in basic POC tasks and concepts, including AO relevant cultural awareness. Every peacekeeper should receive mandatory training on rules of engagement and the use of force that includes practical application during training and exercises.

The situation during a peace operation can change rapidly, as demonstrated in Rwanda in 1994, Sierra Leone in 1999, and Cote d'Ivoire in December 2010. Soldiers deployed on peace operations must be prepared to fight in defense of their life or the life of a civilian they are mandated to protect. In addition to the individual and multi-echelon training focused on POC that deploying soldiers will receive, all soldiers must be proficient in their individual combat skills and their occupational specialties.

## Conclusion:

Development of the requirements for training peace operations forces has proven to be an evolutionary process that requires time and resources to improve. In order to maintain relevancy, preparing peacekeepers for the reality of protecting civilians must be the focus of both thought and innovation. The ACOTA program is initiating the next generation of peace operations training and establishing the standards that the international community will adopt. The TTPs and concepts described in this Training Strategy equip leaders and trainers to employ a suite of proactive solutions to protect those incapable of protecting themselves. This Training Strategy also equips peacekeepers and forces with the knowledge and skills that will allow proactive protection of civilians at the operational and tactical levels.

This plan presents both new and repurposed tractable, pragmatic Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures that provide operational planning and operational constructs that bridge strategic level UN mandates to tactical realities. Protection of Civilians is not a discrete task, and must be integrated in all aspects of training peacekeepers. The integrated, multi-echelon approach presented in this Training Strategy is focused on training Leaders, Units and Teams, Staffs, and Individuals to protect civilians. It presents a spectrum of TTP relevant to the operational and tactical levels of conflict, ranging from preventative engagement and discussion to kinetic operations targeting belligerents.



UN Photo by Eric Kanalstein

The Training and Exercise Scenarios (Annex II) and the Soldier Response Card and Planning and Operations Matrix (Annex III) are tools that can easily be integrated into planning, training, exercises, and operations. They facilitate multi-echelon training and are scalable to accommodate a wide variety of training options.

With the requisite investment of resources and time the proposed multi-echelon Protection of Civilians training can be fully developed and integrated into ACOTA's curriculum and programs of instruction. The effect will be to provide training that is both more comprehensive and more relevant for peacekeepers, and more efficient, effective peacekeeping operations that can put the UN's mandate to protect civilians on the tactical ground.

## Annex I Glossary Of Terms:

**Adaptive Planning:** The capability to create and revise plans rapidly and systematically, as circumstances require. (Department of Defense, 2006)

**Center of Gravity:** The set of characteristics, capabilities, and sources of power from which an actor derives its moral or physical strength, freedom of action, and will to act. (Department of Defense, 2006)

**Community Benefit Tactics:** Actions that directly improve the well-being of a community and directly enhance the protection of civilians.

**Community Presence Tactics:** Active and visible activities of PO forces, particularly in areas that are high risk for violent and criminal activity.

**Community Protection Tactics:** Measures that can be taken to enhance the protection available to a community.

**Co-opt:** To bring an opponent or group into a larger group by offering them role in the larger group.

**Deter:** Presenting a credible threat of an unacceptable response to an anticipated or proposed belligerent action will discourage that action. (*Department of Defense, 2010*)

**Information Operations Tactics:** Outreach, public affairs, and civil military actions that convey to the population messages and themes designed to: protect the population from violence, intimidation, coercion, and reprisals; establish a peaceful environment; improve essential services where possible; and support the rule of law.

**Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response Operations (MAPRO):** A contingency operation to halt the widespread and systematic use of violence by state or non-state armed groups against non-combatants. (Sewall, Raymond, & Chin, 2010)

**Neutralize:** To render ineffective or unusable. (Department of Defense, 2010)

**Pacify:** Satisfy a belligerent through a conciliatory effort.

**Peace enforcement:** Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. (Department of Defense, 2010)

**Peacekeeping:** Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. (Department of Defense, 2010)

**Peace Operations (PO):** A broad term that encompasses multiagency and multinational crisis response and limited contingency operations involving all instruments of national power with military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. Peace operations include peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacemaking, peace building, and conflict prevention efforts. (Department of Defense, 2010)

**Protection of Civilians (POC):** The spectrum of activities, including *in extremis* military activities, necessary to support the humane treatment and security of non-combatants, without any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.


**Threat Oriented Tactics:** Proactive measures focused against belligerents posing a threat to the civilian population.

## Annex II: Training and Exercise Scenarios

The below training and exercise scenarios incorporate a broad range of key leader and staff planning activities. They can be tailored to meet the requirements of units based upon mission mandate, context, and capacity. They are designed to drive both exercises and tactical training.

The scenarios are differentiated by the type of attack presented by the scenario, type of aggressor, potential range of severity, a range of the potential number of victims, duration, and scale.

The definition of and delineation between the levels is not a hard line; there is significant overlap between levels with a broad spectrum of possible effects, and this potential variance in outcomes is captured by the qualitative definition of the levels and the estimation of effect using a descriptive range (e.g., low – mid). It is a model intended to prescribe training and exercises, and not a descriptive portrayal of actual peace-keeping missions or operations, past or current.



### A Complex Protection of Civilians Scenario



## Severity of Violence:

Violence, in all its forms, is difficult to quantitatively measure in terms of degree or intensity. However, an ordinal ranking of the *Severity of Violence* is required to prioritize the allocation of finite resources and operations to counter violence. As people are the ultimate target of violent actions, the below ordinal rankings are intended to establish a generic framework within which planning, training resource allocation, exercise design, and operations can best address the most likely and most dangerous forms of violence against civilians within a given security environment.

- Low: Individuals suffer minor injuries or First Aid Treatment Cases with a probable outcome of no permanent disabilities;
- Mid: Serious injuries causing hospitalization or requiring trained medical treatment; probable outcome of permanent injuries;
- High: Life threatening injuries or multiple serious injuries causing hospitalizations or deaths.

## Number of Victims:

There is no absolute quantitative measure that can precisely define the category *Number of Victims* across all regional environments and conflicts. Here, as with the criterion of *Severity of Violence*, what is achievable is to suggest to Peacekeepers an ordinal ranking, from which leaders and staff can adjust to best fit their own tactical situation's specific context.

One possible framework is that the categories could describe the following:

- Low: The number of victims directly impacted are numbered in the tens to few hundreds of people affected by the attack scenario;
- Mid: The number of victims directly impacted are many hundreds to thousands of people affected by the attack scenario;
- High: The number of victims directly impacted is many thousands to hundreds of thousands.

## Duration:

There is a general correlative relationship between number of victims, severity of violence, scale and duration. There are numerous factors that affect the occurrence and duration of an act or atrocity that prevent accurate measurement. However, the placement and duration of events using scenarios provides a framework for commanders and staffs to anticipate and plan operations. The below ordinal rankings are intended to establish an example framework within which events can be depicted in terms of duration and address the duration of multiple forms of violence against civilians within a given security environment.

- Short: Events or conditions that last from hours to a week
- Mid: Events or conditions that last from one week to several months
- Long: Events or conditions that last from several months to a year or more

**Scale:**

Scale can be used to describe either the quantitative or geographic magnitude of an event. An event that occurs in a densely populated but small urban area could conceivably have the same scale as an event that occurs across a sparsely populated, but larger, geographic region. Understanding the scale of the event and the associated metric(s) (e.g., land area, infrastructure destroyed, etc.) will assist planners in prioritizing and allocating resources. The below ordinal rankings are intended to establish a framework within which resource allocation, prioritization and operations can address the security environment in terms of quantitative relationships.

**Scenario Effects:**

Combining the criteria of the *Type of Attack*, *Potential Range of Severity*, *a Range Of The Potential Number Of Victims*, *Estimated Duration*, and *Scale* on this chart depicts graphically the potential effects of different scenarios.

**Conclusion:**

The above scenarios equip Peacekeepers with a “playbook” of relevant scenarios that support key leader, staff, unit and team, and troop training, at the individual and collective levels from small team to battalion. Additionally, the scenarios inform the development of tactical Contingency Plans (CONPLAN) and Operational Plans (OPLAN), as well as supporting the development of all levels and types of exercises, including:

- Tabletop Exercises
- Map Exercises
- Command Post & Field Exercises
- Situational Training Exercises
- Field Training Exercises

## Scenario: Criminality

Severity: Low-High

Scale: Low

Precedent: UNOCI Cote d'Ivoire

### Learning Objectives

#### Leader

1. Commander demonstrates understanding of conflict background, the environment, and the problem.
2. Commander develops planning guidance and intent that includes specific instruction on identification and development of critical vulnerabilities, lines of effort, and TTPs

#### Staff

1. Staff demonstrates understanding of the environment and understanding of the problem.
2. Staff conducts critical factors analysis to identify critical vulnerabilities.

#### Unit/Team

1. Unit/Team leader employs appropriate TTP based on the situation.
2. Unit leader directs apprehension of perpetrators/instigators of incident/criminal act.

#### Individual Soldier

1. Soldier applies appropriate response IAW the Soldier Response Card

#### Vignette

Your battalion is part of a United Nations Peacekeeping mission. You have been deployed for one month. The first national election since the end of the civil war will occur during your deployment and the success of the election and future for the population depends on your battalion's performance.

Since the conclusion of the civil war in 2002, the Fédération des Étudiants Libérés (FEL) has become increasingly involved in criminally motivated violence including extortion, voter intimidation, assault, and rape. The FEL describes itself as group that represents the students on university campuses but is considered by many to be a pro-government militia. The FEL has been accused of attacking magistrates, journalists, human rights workers, and anyone critical of the ruling Partie Politique Populaire de Peuples (PPPP). The government, which is staffed with numerous former FEL members, denies any relationship with the FEL and PPPP. Despite numerous incidents involving the FEL, none of its members have been brought to justice and the military and police continually look the other way or show up late responding to FEL criminal acts. During the three months prior to your battalion's deployment the FEL has become increasingly violent. Three months ago, FEL members burned police cars and smashed windows of the police station in North Town demanding the release of two FEL members who were arrested for refusing to identify themselves to police. Three weeks later the FEL vandalized the offices of the Human Rights League and the Association of Human Protectors, two leading human rights organization, because they had supported the local workers union members who were striking for better working conditions. During the attack, a security guard was critically injured and died from his injuries and \$80,000 in damage was done to both offices. The only independent television station in the country has been occupied on two occasions by the FEL who demanded that the station read pro PPPP political statements. Stores, formerly



located near university campuses across the country, are closing because of extortion and protection rackets run by the FEL and the rate of armed robbery and rape have increased 30% in cities with universities. 2<sup>nd</sup> Platoon, 3<sup>rd</sup> Company is on patrol in East Town and reports that a group of 20-30 university aged males, armed with machetes is headed towards the offices of the Freedom and Justice League (FJL) and have been observed breaking shop windows.

### **Discussion Points**

1. How can community benefit tactics and the governance line of effort reduce the criminality demonstrated by this scenario?

### **Real World Summary**

The Student Federation of Cote d'Ivoire (FESCI) (*Fédération étudiante et scolaire de Côte d'Ivoire*) is a student organization accused of being a proxy militia controlled by President Laurent Gbagbo's Ivorian Popular Front. FESCI has existed in various forms since the early 1990's when President Gbagbo was a university professor. In the 1990's FESCI was branded an anti-government organization based on its opposition to then president Houphouët-Boigny. After Gbagbo's ascension to the presidency, the FESCI has been an ardent supporter of both Gbagbo and the Ivorian Popular Front. The FESCI has been implicated in numerous instances of violence over the past ten years. FESCI has vandalized print and broadcast media facilities and on several occasions demanded that political messages be put on the air. FESCI is also accused of extortion and racketeering of vendors and business in close proximity to college campuses, raping female college students, beating and intimidating professors, and fomenting mob violence and street protests. The relationship between FESCI and the ruling party ensure that the FESCI criminal activity is overlooked and rarely investigated. (Human Rights Watch, 2008)

## Scenario: Collateral Injuries

Severity: Low-High

Scale: Low-High

Precedent: AMISOM Somalia

### Learning Objectives

#### Leader

1. Commander demonstrates understanding of the use of force and rules of engagement.
2. Commander directs staff to coordinate all relevant information surrounding incident.

#### Staff

1. Staff demonstrates understanding of the environment and understanding of the problem.
2. The staff determines the proximity of hostile elements to incident and civil/military facilities.

#### Unit/Team

1. Unit/Team leader employs appropriate TTP based on the situation.
2. Unit protects civilians in immediate harm within constraints of tactical situation.

#### Individual Soldier

1. Soldier applies appropriate response IAW the Soldier Response Card

### Vignette

Your battalion is part of an African Union peacekeeping mission. During your six month deployment, you have been in near continuous contact with belligerent factions since the deployment began. Eighteen of your soldiers have been killed in action and an additional 25 have been wounded in action. The casualties have come from a combination of belligerent indirect fire, improvised explosive devices (IED), and small arms fire. The primary belligerent faction is Al-Harakat (The Movement), which is committed to the overthrow of the provisional government, the establishment of Sharia law, and purging of all foreigners. Al-Harakat has developed a pattern of conducting attacks within densely populated urban areas such as market places and neighborhoods. These attacks include the firing of mortars and rockets, IEDs, and ambushes.

While conducting a security patrol south of the City Market, 1<sup>st</sup> Platoon, 3<sup>rd</sup> Company is caught in a complex ambush. The lead tank is disabled and the rear armored personnel carrier destroyed by an IED. The platoon has five casualties and is pinned down by direct and indirect fire from Al-Harakat forces. The platoon leader is in communication with both his company commander and the battalion mortar platoon. The platoon leader reports that he can hear the mortars being fired from the north of his position, vicinity of the City Market, and that he is receiving direct fire from the houses and technical vehicles in the neighborhood to the east of his position. The battalion quick reaction force is 5Km away and can respond within 30 minutes of notification.

### Discussion Points

1. How can collateral damage to persons and property be minimized in an urban environment?
2. What other options are available besides indirect fire?
3. What actions should be taken along the information operations line of effort?

## **Real World Summary**

Entering its second decade of conflict, Mogadishu, Somalia continues to be an urban battlefield. African Union (AU) forces serving as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) are opposed by Al-Shabaab, an Islamist extremist group that battles the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) for control of Mogadishu. AU forces control the airport and roads along the Indian Ocean; everything else is essentially controlled by Al-Shabaab. (Langfitt, 2010)

Al-Shabaab frequently attacks AMISOM forces and Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces with indirect fire, improvised explosive devices, and small arms. (Langfitt, 2010) Patrolling in Mogadishu is dangerous. AU forces move from building to building through spider holes in walls to minimize exposure to snipers. Mechanized patrols move carefully down streets that are booby trapped with improvised explosive devices and tank traps that can swallow armored vehicles. (McConnell, 2010) Peacekeeping in Mogadishu is a balancing act as commanders at all levels frequently employ all elements of combat power at their disposal to ensure the safety of their force and accomplishment of the mandate. This includes the use of mortars in a counter battery role or in a direct support role to troops in contact. A frequent tactic of Al-Shabaab is to attack AU and TFG forces in close proximity to civilians and fire mortars and rockets at AU bases from civilian population centers. The AU forces often respond to these Al-Shabaab attacks with indirect fire. Al-Shabaab then uses the AU response as part of their strategic outreach plan leveraging the collateral damage and civilian casualties against AMISOM.



## Scenario: Rape

Severity: Mid

Scale: Low-Mid

Precedent: UNOCI

### Learning Objectives

#### Leader

1. Leader conducts personal liaison with HN government counterpart or delegates to appropriate level.
2. Leader determines requirement for special teams (CIMIC, Medical, JPT).

#### Staff

1. The Staff coordinate with Host Nation / Local Government
2. The staff coordinates collection and disposition of evidence.
3. The staff identifies locations and activities of NGO and international organizations in AO

#### Unit/Team

1. Unit protects civilians in immediate harm
2. Unit provides medical aid and evacuates injured

#### Individual Soldier

1. Evacuate injured and at risk personal to protected areas and medical treatment.

### Vignette

Your battalion has recently deployed a Medical Civil Affairs Program (MEDCAP) to the Western Provinces to provide basic medical services and conduct strategic outreach in a previously neglected part of the Area of Operations. While conducting basic screenings the medics identify a large number of women who report that they have been raped and sexually assaulted over the past four months by men they call “robbers.” During interviews with the medical personnel, the women explain that they quit reporting the rapes because the local authorities would not investigate the allegations and would sometimes take the women to the local security station and rape them again. Based on interviews conducted by the MEDCAP personnel, the rapes and assaults occur along the market roads during harvest season and occur simultaneously with home invasions after the harvest season. As the MEDCAP is preparing to return to its base camp, a truck arrives with multiple victims aboard. A ten year old girl, her mother, and grandmother are all badly beaten and raped; the girl and grandmother are unconscious. One man has died from gunshot wounds and two other men have been beaten and stabbed. The man driving the truck says that they were travelling from their village to see the blue helmet doctors when they were attacked by a group of robbers.

### Discussion Points

1. How can community benefit tactics and the governance line of effort reduce the criminality demonstrated by this scenario?

### Real World Summary

The western administrative regions of Cote d'Ivoire have deteriorated into a state of lawlessness and violence in the years since its civil war. “Criminal gangs, militiamen, police, gendarmes, and rebel forces subject locals to an unrelenting stream of abuses, including banditry, assault, extortion, and the rape of women,

girls, and even babies. State institutions tasked with preventing and holding accountable those responsible for the violence have largely failed to act, allowing a dangerous culture of impunity to take hold.” (Human Rights Watch, 2010) Roads, particularly the road between Duekoue-Bangola, are where the majority of the rapes occur. The perpetrators establish roadblocks near chokepoints and ambush travelers walking on the road or riding in vehicles. During the conduct of the robberies, females ranging from infants to elderly are systematically removed from the group they are traveling with and raped. (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2009)

In 2009 alone, hundreds of women and girls have been sexually assaulted and raped during these robberies. (Human Rights Watch, 2010) Ivorian security forces are either unwilling or unable to do anything about the attacks. UNOCI forces established a market patrol after a series of high-profile attacks in early 2010, several involving group rape. Although this market patrol has reduced attacks along the main road, there are no patrols for women who travel to the main road from surrounding areas. Women in the western area told Human Rights Watch interviewers that when harvest season was finished the rapes and robberies would take the form of home invasions in villages and towns where the women would be raped while their families were forced to watch. (Human Rights Watch, 2010)

## Scenario: Trafficking In Persons

Severity: Mid-High

Scale: Low-Mid

Precedent: MONUC Democratic Republic of the Congo

### Learning Objectives

#### Leader

1. Commander determines constraints on use of force towards protecting civilians.
2. Commander develops planning guidance and intent that includes specific instruction on identification and development of critical vulnerabilities, lines of effort, and TTPs

#### Staff

1. Staff demonstrates understanding of the environment and understanding of the problem.
2. Staff conducts critical factors analysis to identify critical vulnerabilities.

#### Unit/Team

1. Unit provides medical aid and evacuates the injured.
2. Unit provides accurate and timely reports.

#### Individual Soldier

1. Soldier applies appropriate response IAW the Soldier Response Card

#### Vignette

The Army of God (AOG) is a transnational militant group has been involved in numerous civil wars and rebellions over the past 15 years. The group supports itself by stealing supplies and forcing captured adults to serve as slave laborers and prostitutes and captured children to serve as soldiers. Various AOG groups exchange captives based on the requirements of each AOG group. The northeastern part of the country has had minimal UN presence since the cease fire went into effect and your battalion has just recently established operating bases in the northeastern provinces. Community leaders in have expressed their concerns regarding the AOG and have provided a list of persons killed and captured by the AOG over the past 10 years. During a community town hall meeting, a local man brings five women and three children to the battalion civil military operations center. He found them in the bush when he was collecting cassava 15km to the north. They told him that they had recently escaped from the AOG and were afraid of being killed. The women and children were malnourished and had lacerations and bruises on their extremities. One of the adult women described that she was at her house when the AOG rounded up the village, impersonating Soldiers who were going to protect the village. Once the people were together in a group, the AOG killed several and then tied the rest of the village in a human chain and took them into the bush. Once they were in the bush the AOG killed 10 people who were walking slow or complaining. The group was forced to walk for two days until they reached the AOG camp. A few days after they reached the camp, other AOG groups arrived and the various AOG groups traded captives amongst each other. The woman said she was forced to be a wife of a group commander and had to prepare the food and do laundry. The children were kept separate from the adults and would be forced to conduct military training every day. They also made the children kill those who were weak or injured. The woman said that she escaped when she was doing laundry at the river with the other women and that they found the children a few days after they escaped. (Human Rights Watch, 2010)



### **Discussion Points**

1. How can community benefit tactics and the governance line of effort reduce the criminality demonstrated by this scenario?

### **Real World Summary**

The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) is a quasi religious military group originally based out of Uganda. Since 1987, the LRA has been involved in conflicts in Sudan, Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In September and November 2008, the LRA attacked Congolese civilians near the Garamba National Park, killing hundreds of civilians and capturing 316 children. (Human Rights Watch, 2010) The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that in the first two weeks of July 2009 the group carried out 33 attacks in the districts of Upper and Lower Uele in the DRC, killing 26 civilians and abducting 144, including six children. The OCHA records for 2009 indicate that the LRA killed 1,096 civilians and abducted 1,373 adults and 255 children in the Uele districts of the DRC. The LRA has a long history of kidnapping children, forcing boys to fight and girls into sexual slavery. (IRIN, 2009) Those abducted by the LRA are forced to perform certain support roles within the LRA. Those who refuse or do not perform satisfactorily are killed. Male adults are forced to perform manual labor serving as porters and female adults are forced to cook and serve as sex slaves. Children captured by the LRA are conscripted into the LRA and forced to participate in killings from a very early age. The female children who are not turned into soldiers are forced to become sex slaves. (Human Rights Watch, 2010)

## Scenario: Torture

Severity: Mid-High

Scale: Low-Mid

Precedent: Liberia UNOL, precursor to UNMIL

### Learning Objectives

#### Leader

1. Leader directs staff to coordinate all relevant information surrounding incident.
2. Leader conduct personal liaison with HN government counterpart or delegates to appropriate level.

#### Staff

1. Staff coordinates with host nation government.
2. Staff coordinates the collection and disposition of evidence.

#### Unit/Team

1. Unit leader develops the situation.
2. Unit conducts interviews and collects evidence.

#### Individual Soldier

1. Soldier applies appropriate response IAW the Soldier Response Card

#### Vignette

Your battalion has recently deployed as part of a United Nations Peacekeeping mission after ten years of vicious fighting between the national government and rebel forces. Both parties agreed to the peace process although dissident elements exist in both parties. Some of the more hard-line rebel forces moved across the border into the neighboring country and continue to conduct limited operations against the National Security Force (NSF). During the civil war, the NSF had a reputation for detaining and torturing villagers suspected of assisting rebel forces. As part of the peace process, the national government pledged to abide by the Geneva Convention and reform the NSF. Your battalion has started a training and cooperation program with the NSF, which includes weekly classes on the rule of law and human rights as well as joint patrols. After several weeks of training, the NSF personnel are comfortable working with your battalion. During a joint patrol with 1<sup>st</sup> Plt, 1<sup>st</sup> Co, three men are detained by the NSF for criminal activity. The joint patrol takes the men to the NSF station for processing. While in the police station, members of 1<sup>st</sup> Plt hear screams coming from the back of the jail. When they go to investigate they discover five men whose arms and legs are bound behind their backs lying on a floor covered in broken glass. All of the men have visible signs of trauma from being cut and burned on their arms and backs. The NSF station chief insists that the men are rebels and are being held for questioning.

#### Discussion Points

1. How will this incident effect future collaboration with the National Security Force?
2. What options are available to the on-scene commander?

### **Real World Summary**

From April to August 2001 the Liberian Anti-Terrorist Unit (ATU) extra-judicially executed and tortured civilians suspected of supporting armed opposition groups. Torture techniques include whippings, binding arms from the wrist to the elbow behind the back, inserting glass and rocks in victim's mouths before hitting them, forcing individuals to walk on glass, tying people to ant trees, and rubbing hot peppers over open wounds and sensitive body parts. (Amnesty International, 2001) Charles Taylor Jr., the son of the former President of Liberia was found guilty and sentenced to 97 years in prison by a U.S. court for being involved in killings and torture while head of the Anti-Terrorist Unit. Between 1999 and 2002 he and his subordinates tortured people accused of being against his father's regime. (Barrowclough, 2008) Similarly, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) carried out summary executions, torture and rape of civilians suspected of collaborating with the Liberian security forces.



## Scenario: Deprivation of Human Rights

Severity: Mid

Scale: Mid-High

Precedent: UNOSOM I Somalia

### Learning Objectives

#### Leader

1. Commander demonstrates understanding of conflict background, the environment, and the problem.
2. Leader communicate/conducts outreach with belligerent party leadership.

#### Staff

1. Staff demonstrates understanding of the environment and understanding of the problem.
2. Staff conducts critical factors analysis to identify critical vulnerabilities.

#### Unit/Team

1. Unit/Team leader employs appropriate TTP based on the situation.
2. The unit reacts to special threats.

#### Individual Soldier

1. Soldier applies appropriate response IAW the Soldier Response Card

#### Vignette

Your battalion has been deployed for five months as part of a United Nations Peacekeeping mission. The civil war was particularly destructive and the devolution of civil governance in the country has resulted in five political parties vying for power. Each party has its own militia and those militias were the primary belligerents the last year of the civil war. In addition to being devastated by civil war, the country is experiencing its third year of drought. The combination of drought, years of mismanagement of national food supplies, and civil war has resulted in severe food shortages. While the peace process was promising in the beginning, negotiations are starting to falter and the militias are starting to have small skirmishes with each other regarding territory. Your battalion is responsible for securing relief shipments from Warehouse #3 to four distribution centers in the capital region. Two of the distribution centers are located in District North controlled by the Véritable Alliance Démocratique (VAD); one is located in District East, a Vétérans Pour l'Unité (VPU) controlled area; and one is located in District South, a pro Alliance de Liberté et d'Égalité (ALE) district that is currently controlled by the Légion de Liberté et De Progrès (LLP). The warehouse is located in pro ALE District West. Relief convoy operations were operating efficiently until a week ago when ALE militiamen began setting up checkpoints on relief convoy routes demanding a percentage of the shipment as payment for safe passage through District West and the LLP are enforcing a 10% tax on material delivered to the District South distribution center. The tolls and taxes enacted by the ALE and LLP are causing tensions to rise and depriving neighborhoods of essential humanitarian aid. The platoon securing the relief convoy to the District East Distribution Center reports that it is not able to pass an ALE roadblock and that the ALE militiamen are becoming aggressive.

**Discussion Points**

1. How can information operation reduce the tension and resume normal flow of relief supplies?
2. How should the staff go about analyzing the critical vulnerabilities of the militias?

**Real World Summary**

The United Nations created the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) in April 1992 to respond to the collapse in government following a civil war and massive drought related food shortages that put nearly 5 million people at risk for starvation. By October the situation in Somalia had worsened. Various rebel factions had taken control of the country and the former capital, Mogadishu, had become a battleground for various militias competing for power. As the fighting in Mogadishu continued, delivery of humanitarian aid was severely limited. Militias began stealing aid supplies and controlling access into various parts of the city. UNOSOM troops began escorting the relief convoys but were repeatedly attacked by Somali militias. The various warlords were able to grind the relief operation to a virtual halt. Although warehouses were stocked with relief supplies, the security situation prevented the aid from being distributed resulting in an estimated 3,000 people dying per day. (United Nations, 2001)

## Scenario: Protection and Prevention of Displaced Persons

Severity: Mid-High

Scale: Mid-High

Precedent: MONUC: Democratic Republic of the Congo

### **Learning Objectives**

#### **Leader**

1. Commander demonstrates understanding of conflict background, the environment, and the problem.
2. Commander develops planning guidance and intent that includes specific instruction on identification and development of critical vulnerabilities, lines of effort, and preventative engagement strategies.

#### **Staff**

1. The Staff coordinates with Host Nation / Local Government
2. Staff conducts critical factors analysis to identify critical vulnerabilities.

#### **Unit/Team**

1. Unit/Team leader employs appropriate TTP based on the situation.

#### **Individual Soldier**

1. Soldier applies appropriate response IAW the Soldier Response Card

### **Vignette**

After several years of civil war there are hundreds of thousands of displaced persons in IDP camps across the country. One of these camps is located within your battalion's area of operations. The camp is temporary home to 15,000 people, has adequate medical facilities and is well represented by international and non-governmental organizations. The security situation in the camp is stable although in the past few months the camp has been raided three times by unidentified people stealing medical supplies and there has been an increase in rape and gender based violence within the camp after a recent influx of teenage boys from a displaced village on the western border. The rebel group Légion de Liberté et de Progrès (LLP), which is not a party to the peace process, is currently conducting limited cross border combat operations from neighboring countries to discredit the government and disrupt the peace process by attacking villages along the western border, burning homes, and destroying crops. The armies of the bordering countries as well as the host nation Transitional Government army have been deploying additional forces to the border area in what appears to be renewed combat operations against the LLP. Several communities in the southwest of your battalions sector have expressed their fear of attack and are making plans to abandon their villages. The provincial governor has repeatedly told the village leaders that the security situation is under control and the people have a duty to remain in their homes to show the world that the Transitional Government is doing its job. The director of the camp has expressed to you on numerous occasions that the camp is at maximum capacity.

### **Discussion Points**

1. How can community presence and protection tactics enhance the protection of civilians in the camp and villages?
2. What can you do to reduce the impact of additional IDPs in the camp?

### **Real World Summary**

More than 1 million people were forced to leave their homes in the North and South Kivu Provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo during multiple military operations at the beginning of 2009 with that number rising to 1.4 million by April 2010. The 1.4 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) were victims of military operations conducted by numerous armed groups to include:

The Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC)

The National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) - a Rwandan Tutsi backed rebel group now integrated with the DRC military

The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) - a Hutu backed militia

Mai Mai militia- local ethnic anti Tutsi militias

The Coalition of Congolese Patriotic Resistance (PARECO) - a Mai Mai coalition

Many of the 1.4 million IDPs were initially displaced when the FARDC/CNDP began combat operations and then forcibly returned to their homes at the conclusion of FARDC/CNDP operations only to be displaced again. The multiple displacements were caused when the DRC government wanted to demonstrate that operations against the FDLR were successful and closed the IDP camps forcing the IDPs to return home. Many of the IDPs did not go home and established ad hoc IDP camps or moved in with adoptive families agreeing to host them until the security situation allowed them to return home. (Human Rights Watch, 2010) In a February 2010 news article, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – Integrated Regional Information Network (OCHA-IRIN) reported that some IDP camps were located in remote areas, making them more vulnerable to attacks, forced recruitment and other forms of harassment by FDLR militia. IDP camps are routinely raided by criminals or rebel forces stealing aid supplies and kidnapping people. Additionally OCHA reports that there are many people who are not able to access humanitarian aid because they are not allowed to pass through military checkpoints. These people hide outside their homes at night and try as best they can to maintain their property. (IRIN, 2010)



## Scenario: Violence against Women and Children

Severity: Mid-High

Scale: Mid-High

Precedent: UNAMID and UNMIS Sudan

### **Learning Objectives**

#### **Leader**

1. Commander demonstrates understanding of conflict background, the environment, and the problem.
2. Commander develops planning guidance and intent that includes specific instruction on identification and development of critical vulnerabilities, lines of effort, and TTPs

#### **Staff**

1. Staff demonstrates understanding of the environment and understanding of the problem.
2. Staff conducts critical factors analysis to identify critical vulnerabilities.

#### **Unit/Team**

1. Unit/Team leader employs appropriate TTP based on the situation.

#### **Individual Soldier**

1. Soldier applies appropriate response IAW the Soldier Response Card

### **Vignette**

Your battalion has been deployed as part of an African Union peacekeeping mission for the past 2 months. The primary threat in your area of operations is the rebel group Légion de Liberté et de Progrès (LLP), which is not a party to the peace process, is currently conducting limited cross border combat operations from neighboring countries. The LLP habitually abducts women and children to serve as porters, prostitutes, and soldiers. As you continue to familiarize yourself with your area of operations and enhance your situational understanding you are beginning to detect a historic trend of violence against women and children in your area of operations. Prior to the civil war, which ended a year ago, there was a history of inter-ethnic tribal conflict in which women and children were frequently raped and abducted to demonstrate dominance and reduce the genetic purity of the defeated tribe. During the civil war the government sponsored militia continued these practices as well as forcing abducted children to serve as soldiers. Now that the civil war is over there is a fragile population comprised of a large number of former child soldiers, abducted women and children, children of rape, and rape victims who have been ostracized from their communities. Many of these vulnerable groups live in IDP and refugee camps where they are constantly at risk. Over time, these people must be reintegrated into society. Two of the three refugee camps in your area of operations are scheduled to close in the next eight months. There are approximately 1000 ostracized women, teenage mothers, and former child soldiers in each camp that must be successfully reintegrated into a society that is already stretched thin from post conflict tensions. Your battalion has been directed over the next two weeks to conduct a series of meetings at the battalion, company, and platoon level with community leaders and at village open meetings to prepare for the closure of the IDP camps and reintegration of camp residents.

### **Discussion Points**

1. What measures can be taken at various levels of leadership and at the individual level to protect women and children from violence?

### **Real World Summary**

Violence against women and children (VAWC) continues to be a problem in Sudan, particularly the Southern regions and Darfur. Encompassing a broad range of crimes and abuses, VAWC is characterized by systematic violence of a sexual nature but also includes abduction, child soldiers, mental and physical abuse, and denial of basic services. In 2004, a UNICEF child protection survey discovered a very large number of rape cases in Darfur including: 41 school girls and teachers who were gang raped, the gang rape of minors, and the abduction of children and women. (Amnesty International, 2004) Violence against women and children Darfur, primarily perpetrated by government-sponsored Janjawid militia is systematic and not just the result of conflict or restless soldiers. The violence is used to humiliate, destabilize and destroy certain populations while also providing sexual services for soldiers and reinforcing the hatred of the enemy. The majority of sexually violent acts against women and children are conducted when during the pursuit of daily activities including searching for firewood, fetching water, going to school, and working the fields. Attacks are often brutal with victims enduring horrific physical torture before and after the assaults. (Darfur Australia Network, 2006)

Jonglei state in southern Sudan has also experienced a high volume of violence against women and children related primarily to inter-communal ethnic conflict. Since March 2009, over 1,000 women and children have died as a result of this tribal violence. Child abduction related to tribal conflict has continued to be a problem. Jonglei state officials report that there were 227 child abductions related to tribal conflict from November 2008 to November 2009. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) continues to launch sporadic incursions into villages resulting in the abduction and death of women and children in southern Sudan. In 2009, 177 Sudanese children were abducted. (Sudan-Children and Armed Conflict, 2010)

## Scenario: Systematic Violence

Severity: Mid-High

Scale: Mid-High

Precedent: ECOMOG Sierra Leone

### Learning Objectives

#### Leader

1. Leader communicate/conducts outreach with belligerent party leadership.
2. Commander develops planning guidance and intent that includes specific instruction on identification and development of critical vulnerabilities, lines of effort, and TTPs

#### Staff

1. Staff demonstrates understanding of the environment and understanding of the problem.
2. The staff determines the proximity of hostile elements to incident and civil/military facilities.

#### Unit/Team

1. Unit/Team leader employs appropriate TTP based on the situation.

#### Individual Soldier

1. Soldier applies appropriate response IAW the Soldier Response Card

### Vignette

Your battalion has been serving as part of a regional peacekeeping force under a UN mandate following a brutal ten year civil war. The mandate includes Chapter VII language that directs “peacekeeping forces may take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its infantry battalions and as it deems it within its capabilities, to protect United Nations and co-located JMC personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, and protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.” The civil war was fought over ethnic tensions and control of natural resources. The primary belligerent parties during the civil war were the Federal Government Defense Force (FGDF) and the People’s Revolutionary Freedom Movement (PRFM). The PRFM received popular support from the rural poor and substantial backing from neighboring countries in an attempt to gain influence over the country’s vast natural resources. Peace negotiations have not been going well and the PRFM has been increasing negative anti-government rhetoric. Recently, PRFM gangs have been driving through neighborhoods threatening citizens and shopkeepers. During the morning staff update, the tactical operations center receives a call from the district police station that PRFM rebels have seized three elementary schools and have lined up all of the children in the playground. The battalion operations officer dispatched 2<sup>nd</sup> platoon, 1<sup>st</sup> Company, the battalion quick reaction force, to the Friends School and the platoon leader reports that he is five minutes away from the school. The Peace School and Patriots School are both 15 minutes away from company operating bases.

### Discussion Points

1. What determines imminent threat of physical violence?
2. If the school crisis is resolved without serious incident, how can you mitigate this from happening in the future?

### **Real World Summary**

The Sierra Leone civil war took a turn for the worse in January 1999 when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) attacked government troops and Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) peacekeepers capturing and occupying Freetown, the national capital. During the three-week occupation the RUF enacted a near textbook application of systematic violence. Methodically moving through Freetown, the RUF focused their combat power against the civilian population and in the three weeks that they controlled the capital, they had killed several thousand civilians, chopped the hands off of children and adults, burned people alive, and captured thousands children and young women. The RUF, pushed out of Freetown by ECOMOG forces, enacted a scorched earth policy, burning neighborhoods as they withdrew, leaving over 50,000 Freetown residents homeless. (Human Rights Watch, 1999)



## Scenario: Genocide

Severity: High

Scale: Mid-High

Precedent: UNAMIR Rwanda

### Learning Objectives

#### Leader

1. Leader conducts liaison with local leaders and stakeholders.
2. Leader communicate/conducts outreach with belligerent party leadership.

#### Staff

1. The Staff coordinate with Host Nation / Local Government.
2. The staff considers adaptive planning and FDO options.

#### Unit/Team

1. Units/Teams react to special threats.
2. Unit/Team leader employs appropriate TTP based on the situation.

#### Individual Soldier

1. Soldier applies appropriate response IAW the Soldier Response Card

### Vignette

Your battalion is in its third month of a UN Peacekeeping mission following a brutal two year civil war. The civil war was the result of a centuries old struggle for dominance between two competing ethnic groups, the Olo and the Edo, which began during the colonial period and grew progressively worse after independence. The Edo seized power in the early 1960's and marginalized the Olo who were the ethnic minority. The Olo revolted two years ago and fought the Edo dominated government to a standstill. Both parties agreed to a UN brokered ceasefire while a power sharing agreement is developed.

The daily operations reports and intelligence summarizes are full of indicators that something might be developing but it still requires more analysis. The Edo government, which still controls all of the civil institutions while the power sharing agreement is being negotiated, started issuing ethnic identification cards to citizens that classified people as Edo or Olo. These cards are required for virtually all daily transactions. The newspapers and radio stations have started dehumanizing the Olos in stories, editorials, and programs. Cartoons and billboards are depicting Olos as rats and snakes and children are being taught nursery rhymes and songs at school that promote killing Olos. Towns and districts are forming Edo protection societies. These groups claim that they are organizing to defend themselves in the event of another Olo uprising. The government is currently preventing Olos from starting their own defense leagues until after the power sharing agreement was finalized. Politicians and popular journalists are polarizing the populace with speeches and editorials telling people that they have to pick a side.

During a recent presence patrol, the 3<sup>rd</sup> platoon leader from the reconnaissance company overheard several members of an Edo protection society discussing the most efficient way to kill Olo's and whether it was worthwhile to dispose of the bodies.

### **Discussion Points**

1. How can community benefit tactics and the governance line of effort reduce the criminality demonstrated by this scenario?

### **Real World Summary**

Approximately 800,000 people were killed in a 100 day period in Rwanda from April to July 1994 when the ethnically Hutu majority systematically planned and killed the Tutsi minority and moderate Hutu's. The genocide ended when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), an exiled Tutsi resistance group, was able to take control of the country. This campaign of violence that intended to destroy the Tutsi population in Rwanda was not a spontaneous event and in hind sight, should not have taken the world by surprise. Centrally planned and organized, death squads called Interahamwe were supported by government officials and the military as they rounded up Tutsi's and killed them at the rate of approximately 8,000 per day. As early as 1988, Rwandan identification cards declared a person's ethnicity, making it easier to identify who should be killed and Tutsi's were regularly defamed and degraded in the media. Hutu's began practice or trial exterminations as early as 1990 killing smaller groups of 300-500 Tutsi's to gauge national and international reaction. (Stanton, 2002) Tension between Tutsi and Hutu had always existed and grew exponentially worse when the Hutu's seized power in 1959 and sent large numbers of Tutsi's into exile. The Tutsi RPF tried to seize control in 1990 which resulted in a three year civil war that ended with the 1993 Arusha Peace Accords. The fragile peace process, sponsored by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, ended and the genocide began when President Juvenal Habyarimana's airplane was shot down while landing in the Rwandan capital. (Peace Pledge Union, 2002)

General Roméo Dallaire, the Canadian commander of the U.N. Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UN-AMIR), warned the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in January that Hutu extremists were planning a campaign to exterminate Tutsis. Dallaire also asked DPKO for authority to confiscate the caches of machetes and other weapons that had been shipped into Rwanda for the Interahamwe but was told that the UN mandate did not support such action. (Adelman & Suhrke, 1999)

# Annex III: Planning and Operations Matrices

Scenario	Role	Steady State		NON-LETHAL		LETHAL	
		Consent/Compliance	Everyday Indicator	Coercion	Force	Force	Force
<b>Criminality</b> (Criminal acts of violence perpetrated against people ranging from intimidation to murder)	Individual	Soldiers alert and observant for any indications of crime	Warm Perpetrators and Alert Civilians	Demonstrate means/intent to use lethal force to stop action and direct Civilians to safe area	Apply non-lethal means to stop action and control Civilians until crisis resolves	Fire weapon to eliminate threat and prevent harm to civilian	
	Team/Unit	Presence Patrols in at risk areas	On site commander (OSC) deploys forces to points of dominance and notifies headquarters	Request additional assets/forces if required	Use non-lethal weapons to subdue perpetrator(s)	Control subordinate to use minimum lethal force to resolve situation	
	Staff	Conduct Pattern and Predictive Analysis to template criminal activity	Monitor situation and advise commander Coordinate with host nation police	Alert and deploy additional assets/forces as required/directed	Convene crisis planning team and develop courses of action	Notify higher headquarters and plan for post incident de-escalation	
	Leader	Engagements and meetings with local leaders	Monitor situation	Authorize deployment of additional assets/forces	Command and control additional assets/forces	Engage local leaders to reinforce strategic themes and messages and deescalate tension	
	Liaison	Establish relationships with HN law enforcement	Develop communication and information sharing	Send and receive timely information between headquarters	Keep units informed of current and planned future actions	Follow up with HN and monitor situation	
<b>Collateral Injuries</b> (Injuries suffered by parties not directly associated with or targeted by violent factions)	Individual	Soldiers Alert and Observant. Aware of civilian locations and high risk areas	Soldiers aware of civilian locations, gathering places, and high risk areas	Direct Civilians to safe area	Apply non-lethal means to stop action and control Civilians until crisis resolves	Eliminate threat and prevent harm to civilian	
	Team/Unit	Presence Patrols in at risk areas. Dissuade belligerents from conducting operations in populated areas.	OSC considers risk and collateral injuries when planning application of force.	Request additional assets/forces if required. Avoid decisive engagements in populated areas when possible	OSC considers non-combatant locations when planning indirect fires; assists with medical evacuation	Control subordinate to use minimum lethal force to resolve situation	
	Staff	Conduct pattern and predictive analysis to template belligerent forces	Develop clearance of fires procedures.	Track and monitor high population areas and gathering places (markets, religious, etc)	Convene crisis planning team and develop courses of action	Notify higher headquarters and plan for post incident de-escalation	
	Leader	Engagements and meetings with local leaders to inform of benefit, presence, and protection activities	Inform population of risks associated with belligerent activity.	Authorize deployment of additional assets/forces	Command and control additional assets/forces	Engage local leaders to reinforce strategic themes and messages and deescalate tension	
	Liaison	Work with HN security forces to minimize risk of collateral injuries	Work with HN security forces to minimize risk of collateral injuries	Send and receive timely information between headquarters	Assist in coordination for medical evacuation	Follow up with HN and monitor situation	
<b>Rape</b> (The opportunistic and often wide-spread sexual attack of vulnerable people by a group incident to a crisis)	Individual	Soldiers alert and observant for any indications of rape	Warm Perpetrators and Alert Civilians. Inform population post rape care programs.	Demonstrate means/intent to use lethal force to stop action and direct Civilians to safe area	Apply non-lethal means to stop action and control Civilians until crisis resolves	Fire weapon to eliminate threat and prevent harm to civilian	
	Team/Unit	Presence and Protection tactics in at risk areas	Small unit leaders work with community leaders and persons of influence to determine cause and develop local plans to eliminate	Identify perpetrators request additional assets/forces if required. Immediate care for victims.	Use non-lethal weapons to subdue perpetrator(s) in cooperation with HN security forces	Control subordinate to use minimum lethal force to resolve situation. Increase use of presence, protection, and benefit tactics	
	Staff	Conduct pattern and predictive analysis to template perpetrator activity	Monitor situation and advise commander. Coordinate with host nation security forces	Alert and deploy additional assets/forces as required/directed	Convene crisis planning team and develop courses of action	Notify higher headquarters and plan for post incident de-escalation	
	Leader	Engagements and meetings with local leaders to identify particular root causes and explain post rape care initiatives	Monitor situation	Authorize deployment of additional assets/forces	Command and control additional assets/forces	Engage local leaders to reinforce strategic themes and messages	
	Liaison	Work with HN security forces to identify high risk areas and distribute public awareness materials	Inform unit of any rape or sexual crimes reported to HN security forces and maintain communication between levels.	Send and receive timely information between headquarters	Assist in coordination for medical evacuation	Assist and coordinate evacuation and care of victims.	
<b>Trafficking in Persons</b> (The organized coercion of people into dangerous or illicit activities)	Individual	Soldiers alert and observant for any indications of trafficking in persons	Warn Perpetrators and Alert Civilians. Explore the risks and warning signs of human trafficking. Inform communities of the consequences of human trafficking.	Demonstrate means/intent to use lethal force to stop action and direct Civilians to safe area	Apply non-lethal means to stop action and control Civilians until crisis resolves	Fire weapon to eliminate threat and prevent harm to civilian	
	Team/Unit	Identify presence and protection tactics in templated areas at risk for trafficking in persons	Team/Unit leader works with community leaders and local plans to eliminate	Move to location of perpetrators Request additional assets/forces if required. Care for victims.	Use non-lethal weapons to subdue perpetrator(s).	Control subordinate to use minimum lethal force to resolve situation	
	Staff	Conduct pattern and predictive analysis to template belligerent activity	Monitor situation and advise commander Coordinate with host nation security forces	Alert and deploy additional assets/forces as required/directed	Convene crisis planning team and develop courses of action for large scale trafficking	Notify higher headquarters and plan for post incident de-escalation	
	Leader	Engagements and meetings with local leaders	Monitor situation	Authorize deployment of additional assets/forces	Command and control additional assets/forces	Engage local leaders to reinforce strategic themes and messages	
	Liaison	Work with HN security forces to identify high risk areas and distribute public awareness materials	Inform unit of any kidnappings or sales of humans reported to local authorities	Inform unit of any kidnappings or sales of humans reported to local authorities	Keep unit informed of HN reaction. Coordinate with IO/NGO for victim care and repatriation	Keep unit informed of HN reaction	
<b>Torture</b> (Infliction of significant physical or mental pain on individuals or groups)	Individual	Soldiers alert and observant for any indications of torture	Warn Perpetrators and Alert Civilians	Demonstrate means/intent to use lethal force to stop action and direct Civilians to safe area	Apply non-lethal means to stop action and control Civilians until crisis resolves	Fire weapon to eliminate threat and prevent harm to civilian	
	Team/Unit	Patrols are alert and observant for any indications of torture. Tactics tailored to templated areas of torture.	On site commander deploys forces to points of dominance to secure area and notifies headquarters.	Request additional assets/forces if required	Convene crisis planning team and develop courses of action	Control subordinate to use minimum lethal force to resolve situation	
	Staff	Pattern and Predictive Analysis	Monitor situation and advise commander Coordinate with host nation government	Alert and deploy additional assets/forces as required/directed	Convene crisis planning team and develop courses of action	Notify higher headquarters and plan for post incident de-escalation	
	Leader	Engagements and meetings with local leaders	Contact HN counterpart.	Authorize deployment of additional assets/forces	Command and control additional assets/forces	Engage local leaders to reinforce strategic themes and messages and deescalate tension	
	Liaison	Work with HN security forces to distribute public information	Inform unit of any torture reported to local authorities	Maintain communications	Keep unit informed of HN reaction. Coordinate with IO/NGO for victim care and repatriation	Keep unit informed of HN reaction	

Scenario	Role	Steady State		NON-LETHAL		LETHAL	
		Consent/Compliance	Event/Incident/Indicator	Coercion		Force	
<b>Deprivation</b> (Denial of food, water, materials, services, access or other means necessary for survival, shelter, sustenance and other needs)	Individual	Soldiers alert and observant for any indications of deprivation	Warn perpetrators to stop actions. Warn civilians to leave the immediate area.	Perpetrators means/intent to use lethal force to stop action and direct civilians to safe area	Apply non-lethal means to stop action and control civilians until crisis resolves	Fire weapon to eliminate threat and prevent harm to civilian	
	Team/Unit	Threat, protection, presence and benefit tactics in areas identified at risk for deprivation	OSC deploys forces to points of dominance to secure area and notifies headquarters of threat and current situation.	Request additional assets/forces if required	Use non-lethal weapons to subdue perpetrator(s)	Control subordinates to use minimum lethal force to resolve situation	
	Staff	Pattern and predictive analysis regarding deprivation identify centers of gravity for perpetrators and develop planning options. Identify methods to deliver aid to civilians	Monitor situation and advise commander. Coordinate with host nation, IO's and NGO's	Alert and deploy additional assets/forces as required/directed	Convene crisis planning team and develop courses of action to eliminate cause of deprivation and provide short term relief for population	Notify higher headquarters and continue to monitor situation.	
	Leader	Engagements and meetings with local leaders	Monitor situation coordinate with higher headquarters for resources	Authorize deployment of additional assets/forces. Keep IO and NGO informed of situation	Command and control additional assets/forces	Work with local leaders to reinforce strategic themes and messages and develop a viable solution	
	Liaison	Work with HNT to identify possible deprivation issues	Inform unit of any deprivation issues	Maintain communications with unit, HN, IO/NGO	Keep unit informed of HN reaction. Coordinate with IO/NGO for aid to victims	Keep unit informed of HN reaction	
	Individual	Soldiers alert and observant for any precursors to displacement	Warn Perpetrators and Alert Civilians	Demonstrate means/intent to use lethal force to stop action and direct civilians to safe area	Apply non-lethal means to stop action and control civilians until crisis resolves	Fire weapon to eliminate threat and prevent harm to civilian	
<b>Forced Displacement</b> (Infliction of significant physical or mental pain on individuals or groups)	Team/Unit	Threat and protection tactics in at risk areas	Outreach target population and perpetrators with IO themes and messages to dissuade belligerent action and preclude displacement	Identify secure routes from villages to IDP camps and protected areas	Request additional forces if required	Protect civilians by denying key terrain and avenues of approach to belligerent parties	
	Staff	Identify causes of potential displacement and develop preventative engagement strategy	ID alternate sites for IDP refuge/protected area. Coordinate with international and regional organizations for assistance	Alert and deploy additional assets/forces as required/directed	Convene crisis planning team and develop courses of action	Notify higher headquarters and plan for post incident de-escalation	
	Leader	Conduct preventative engagement discussion with belligerent leaders	Coordinate with higher headquarters for assistance in planning FDO as well as securing IDPs.	Authorize deployment of additional assets/forces	Command and control additional assets/forces	Engage local leaders to reinforce strategic themes and messages and deescalate tension	
	Liaison	Work with HNT to identify at risk groups	Monitor status of IDP camps	Maintain communications with unit, HN, IO/NGO	Keep unit informed of HN reaction. Coordinate with IO/NGO for aid to victims	Keep unit informed of HN reaction	
	Individual	Soldiers alert and observant for any indicators of violence against Women and Children (VAMC)	Set the example for the proper treatment of Women and Children.	Demonstrate means/intent to use lethal force to stop VAMC and direct victim to safe area	Apply non-lethal means to stop action and control victim until crisis resolves	Fire weapon to eliminate threat and prevent harm to victim or innocent civilian	
	Team/Unit	IO, presence, protection, and benefit tactics in targeted areas to prevent violence	Small unit leaders work with community leaders and persons of influence to determine cause and develop local plans to eliminate	Identify perpetrators request additional assets/forces if required. Immediate care for victims.	Use non-lethal weapons to subdue perpetrator(s) in cooperation with HN security forces	Control subordinates to use minimum lethal force to resolve situation. Increase use of presence, protection, and benefit tactics	
<b>Violence Against Women and Children</b> (Widespread violent attacks against a targeted demographic or population's women and children)	Staff	Conduct pattern and predictive analysis to template areas where VAMC will be prevalent. Develop IO plan ICW higher headquarters	Coordinate with IO/NGO for assistance in planning for reintigration of at risk population	Monitor reintigration program and keep commander informed.	Convene crisis planning team and develop courses of action	Notify higher headquarters and plan for post incident de-escalation	
	Leader	Engagements and meetings with local leaders to identify root causes of VAMC and develop prevention mechanisms	Monitor situation	Authorize deployment of additional assets/forces	Command and control additional assets/forces	Engage local leaders to reinforce strategic themes and messages	
	Liaison	Work with HN security forces to identify high risk areas and distribute public awareness materials	Inform unit of any rape or sexual crimes reported to HN security forces and maintain communication between forces.	Inform unit of any rape or sexual crimes reported to HN security forces and maintain communication between forces.	Inform unit of any rape or sexual crimes reported to HN security forces and maintain communication between forces.	Assist and coordinate evacuation and care of victims.	
	Individual	Soldiers alert and observant for any indications of systematic violence	Warn Perpetrators and Alert Civilians	Perpetrators means/intent to use lethal force to stop action and direct civilians to safe area	Apply non-lethal means to stop action and control civilians until crisis resolves	Fire weapon to eliminate threat and prevent harm to civilian	
	Team	Threat, protection, and presence tactics in at risk areas	OSC deploys forces to secure area and control situation	Request additional assets/forces if required	Use non-lethal weapons to subdue perpetrator(s). Plans for safeguard and evacuation of potential victims	Control subordinates to use minimum lethal force to resolve situation	
	Staff	Conduct pattern and predictive analysis to template areas where systematic violence will likely occur. Develop preventative engagement strategy plan ICW higher headquarters	Begin adaptive planning and developing FDO's as well as tactical solutions to situation. Consider all non-lethal options available.	Provide additional assets to OSC and monitor situation within AO to detect similar incidents	Convene crisis planning team and develop/refine courses of action	Notify higher headquarters and plan for post incident de-escalation	
<b>Systematic Violence</b> (A campaign of violence against a targeted population)	Leader	Conduct preventative engagement discussion with belligerent leaders	Coordinate with higher headquarters for assistance in adaptive planning and FDOs	Authorize deployment of additional assets/forces	Command and control additional assets/forces	Engage local leaders to reinforce strategic themes and messages and deescalate tension	
	Liaison	Work with HN security forces to identify high risk areas and distribute public awareness materials	Inform unit of any violence reported to HN security forces and maintain communication between forces.	Send and receive timely information between headquarters	Assist in coordination for medical evacuation	Assist and coordinate evacuation and care of victims.	
	Individual	Soldiers alert and observant for any indications of genocide	Warn Perpetrators and Alert Civilians	Demonstrate means/intent to use lethal force to stop action and direct civilians to safe area	Apply non-lethal means to stop action and control civilians until crisis resolves	Fire weapon to eliminate threat and prevent harm to civilian	
	Team/Unit	Threat, protection, and presence tactics in at risk areas	OSC deploys forces to secure area and control situation	Request additional assets/forces if required	Use non-lethal weapons to subdue perpetrator(s). Plans for safeguard and evacuation of potential victims	Control subordinates to use minimum lethal force to resolve situation	
	Staff	Conduct pattern and predictive analysis to understand the incident in context. Develop preventative engagement strategy ICW higher headquarters	Begin adaptive planning and developing FDO's as well as tactical solutions to situation. Consider all non-lethal options available.	Provide additional assets to OSC and monitor situation within AO to detect similar incidents	Convene crisis planning team and develop/refine courses of action	Notify higher headquarters and plan for post incident de-escalation	
	Leader	Conduct preventative engagement discussion with belligerent leaders	Coordinate with higher headquarters for assistance in adaptive planning and FDOs	Authorize deployment of additional assets/forces	Command and control additional assets/forces	Engage local leaders to reinforce strategic themes and messages and deescalate tension	
<b>Genocide</b> (A campaign of violence with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group)	Staff	Conduct pattern and predictive analysis to understand the incident in context. Develop preventative engagement strategy ICW higher headquarters	Begin adaptive planning and developing FDO's as well as tactical solutions to situation. Consider all non-lethal options available.	Provide additional assets to OSC and monitor situation within AO to detect similar incidents	Convene crisis planning team and develop/refine courses of action	Notify higher headquarters and plan for post incident de-escalation	
	Leader	Conduct preventative engagement discussion with belligerent leaders	Coordinate with higher headquarters for assistance in adaptive planning and FDOs	Authorize deployment of additional assets/forces	Command and control additional assets/forces	Engage local leaders to reinforce strategic themes and messages and deescalate tension	
	Liaison	Work with HN security forces to identify high risk areas and distribute public awareness materials	Inform unit of any violence reported to HN security forces and maintain communication between forces.	Send and receive timely information between headquarters	Assist in coordination for medical evacuation	Assist and coordinate evacuation and care of victims.	
	Individual	Soldiers alert and observant for any indications of genocide	Warn Perpetrators and Alert Civilians	Demonstrate means/intent to use lethal force to stop action and direct civilians to safe area	Apply non-lethal means to stop action and control civilians until crisis resolves	Fire weapon to eliminate threat and prevent harm to civilian	
	Team/Unit	Threat, protection, and presence tactics in at risk areas	OSC deploys forces to secure area and control situation	Request additional assets/forces if required	Use non-lethal weapons to subdue perpetrator(s). Plans for safeguard and evacuation of potential victims	Control subordinates to use minimum lethal force to resolve situation	
	Staff	Conduct pattern and predictive analysis to understand the incident in context. Develop preventative engagement strategy ICW higher headquarters	Begin adaptive planning and developing FDO's as well as tactical solutions to situation. Consider all non-lethal options available.	Provide additional assets to OSC and monitor situation within AO to detect similar incidents	Convene crisis planning team and develop/refine courses of action	Notify higher headquarters and plan for post incident de-escalation	

\*\*\* DISCLAIMER: Mission commanders are responsible for modifying this tool for the operational environment and specific mission mandate\*\*\*



## ANNEX IV: Soldier Response Card

Soldier Response Card				
ACTION	Shout	Show	Shove	Shoot
Against Perpetrator	Warn Perpetrator	Demonstrate means/intent to use lethal force to stop action	Apply non-lethal means to stop action	Fire weapon to eliminate threat
For Civilians	Alert Civilians to threat	Direct Civilians to safe area	Control Civilians until crisis resolves	Prevent harm to civilian
Scenario	Action	Scenario	Action	
<b>Criminality</b> (Criminal acts of violence perpetrated against people, ranging from intimidation to murder)	REPORT	<b>Deprivation</b> (Denial of food, water, materials, services, access or other means necessary for survival, shelter, sustenance and other needs)	REPORT	
	DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT	
	IMMEDIATE AID		IMMEDIATE AID	
	PROTECT		PROTECT	
	OUTREACH		ASSIST	
<b>Collateral Injuries</b> (Injuries suffered by parties not directly associated with or targeted by violent factions)	REPORT	<b>Forced Displacement</b> (Infliction of significant physical or mental pain on individuals or groups)	REPORT	
	DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT	
	IMMEDIATE AID		IMMEDIATE AID	
	PROTECT		PROTECT	
	ASSIST		SPEED TO PROTECTED AREA	
<b>Rape</b> (The opportunistic and often wide-spread sexual attack of vulnerable people by a group incident to a crisis)	REPORT	<b>Violence Against Women and Children</b> (Widespread, violent attacks against a targeted demographic or population’s women and children )	REPORT	
	DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT	
	IMMEDIATE AID		IMMEDIATE AID	
	PROTECT		PROTECT	
	SPEED TO PROTECTED AREA		SPEED TO PROTECTED AREA	
<b>Trafficking in Persons</b> (The organized coercion of people into dangerous or illicit activities)	REPORT	<b>Systematic Violence</b> (A campaign of violence against a targeted population)	REPORT	
	DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT	
	IMMEDIATE AID		IMMEDIATE AID	
	PROTECT		PROTECT	
	SPEED TO PROTECTED AREA		SPEED TO PROTECTED AREA	
<b>Torture</b> (Infliction of significant physical or mental pain on individuals or groups)	REPORT	<b>Genocide</b> (A campaign of violence with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group )	REPORT	
	DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT	
	IMMEDIATE AID		IMMEDIATE AID	
	PROTECT		PROTECT	
	SPEED TO PROTECTED AREA			

## ANNEX V: Current ACOTA Training Event Descriptions

**Training Strategy Conference.** A five-day seminar focused on developing a top-level strategy for military training with particular emphasis on peace support operations training. The intended participants are senior military (lieutenant colonels, colonels, general officers) and/or civilian defense officials. The Training Strategy Conference is conducted before the commencement of ACOTA training. During the course of a multi-year ACOTA partnership, ACOTA and Partner Country leaders will periodically (usually annually) meet for a **Training Strategy Update**.

**Essential Methods of Instruction (EMI).** A five-day course focused on developing instructional and training skills for trainers. Intended participants include future trainers as well as designated battalion officers and non-commissioned officers. This training event is held at the outset of an ACOTA partnership and repeated as desired by the Partner Country throughout the multi-year period of the partnership.

**Training Planning, Management and Development (TPMD).** A five-day course focused on developing a battalion's Mission Essential Task List for peace support operations training. Intended participants include the battalion commander, battalion staff officers, company commanders and trainers (individuals designated to participate in the train-the-trainer process so that they will be trainers in the future). The TPMD is designed to be the first event for each battalion that goes through the ACOTA peace support operations training sequence.

**Command and Staff Operational Skills (CSOS).** Ten training days (two weeks) of instruction in the Military Decision Making Process as well as instruction on special command and staff operations and considerations in peace support operations. Intended participants include the battalion commander, battalion staff, company commanders, trainers and other officers as designated by the battalion commander.

**Command Post Exercise (CPX).** Immediately following the CSOS training, a five to ten day command post exercise will provide practical application for the training objections of CSOS. The CPX will provide the battalion commander and his staff with the opportunity to practice the Military Decision Making Process resulting in a battalion operations order for a peace support operations scenario. Intended participants include the battalion commander, battalion staff and company commanders.

**Computer Assisted Command Post Exercise (CAX).** A five-day computer-assisted simulation exercise that provides the battalion commander, the battalion staff and company commanders the opportunity to conduct real-time command and staff operations in a peace support operation scenario. This exercise is normally scheduled immediately following the CPX when it is desired by the Partner Country.

**Peace Support Operations Soldier Skills Field Training (PSOSST).** Fifteen to twenty training days (three-four weeks) of instruction and practical application in the field, focused on soldier skills and peace support operations skills for individual soldiers, squads, platoons and companies. The training culminates with a battalion level exercise. Intended participants include the entire battalion, including the battalion commander, battalion staff, all the officers and soldiers of the battalion and trainers.

## Specialized Training

**Level II Hospital.** Fifteen days of training for a composite medical staff of approximately forty personnel who will have already received basic qualification training in their respective medical and administrative occupation specialties. The Level II Hospital training provides training on the tasks listed in United Nations Medical Support Manual for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.

**Battalion Logistics in Peacekeeping Operations.** Twenty training days that examines the unique logistical challenges connected to equipment sustainment during a PSO. The course covers proper warehousing storage, requisition management, and best practices for Transportation and Tactical Operations. Other critical logistics planning skills addressed include convoy operations, convoy briefs, convoy immediate action, tactical operations center procedures and medical logistics.

**PSO Engineer Training.** Ten training days focused on personnel who have already received basic qualification training in their respective construction and / or combat engineer occupational specialties. Training teaches techniques for fortification of positions, road and bridge enhancements, risk mitigation against mines and IEDs, and maintenance of engineer equipment under the austere environmental conditions typically encountered in a peacekeepers area of operation.

**Negotiation Skills Training.** Five training days that provide additional skills to peacekeepers for the non-violent management and/or resolution of conflicts and problems they are likely to face in contemporary peacekeeping environments. The training focuses on analysis, communication, negotiation, third party and problem solving skills. Each course is adapted for the particular mission/environment where participants are deploying. The training approach uses a mix of interactive discussion, video, and exercises designed to keep participants engaged with the material and applying it to scenarios they are likely to face in the future.

**Driver Training.** Ten training days include, but are not limited to, basic driving techniques, driving under adverse conditions, driving in limited visibility conditions, safety considerations, and preventive maintenance checks and services. During refresher training battalion drivers receive additional wheel-time operating tactical vehicles.

**Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO)/ Company Grade Officer (CGO) Junior Leadership Course.** Ten training days that emphasize the roles, duties and leadership responsibilities of company commanders, platoon leaders, small-unit leaders and non commissioned officers while leading soldiers preparing for, deploying to, operating in and redeploying from peacekeeping missions.

**Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC)** Five to ten training days based on the core TCCC curriculum developed by the U.S. tri-service Defense Medical Readiness Training Institute (DMRTI). The training audience will have already been trained as medics. This training prepares medics for the unique and difficult environment they will face when deployed to a peace mission. The training is designed for a PSO tactical combat casualty medical platoon.

**Combat Lifesavers Training (CLS)/ Field Medical Training (FMT)** Five training days that provides focused, hands-on instruction emphasizing the skills necessary to perform lifesaving treatment of personnel injured during the conduct of PSO missions. Accordingly, focuses on prevention and treatment of heat injuries, CPR, airway management, intravenous access, treatment of fractures, and evacuation of a casualty. Training scenarios focus on serious injuries likely to be sustained by soldiers during PSO deployments (gunshot wounds, complex fractures, extreme burns, and internal injuries due to traumatic impact and pri-

mary blast effects). The training emphasis is stabilization of wounded persons for movement to and follow-on treatment by a medical specialist. Training is designed to operate with CLS / Level 3 trauma bag for each student.

**PSO Mortar Training.** Five training days includes live firing of the mortars for the purpose of orientation and safety. The training also includes mortar fire support and mortar unit logistics in support of the battle group and live-fire rifle marksmanship training for the individual soldiers.

**PSO APC/Mechanized Ops Training.** Fifteen training days. The command and staff level training is a review of successful applications of mechanized systems in recent peace support operations; techniques for employing armored vehicles at check points, in convoy security, in base security, and with quick reaction forces; and logistical considerations in the employment of armored vehicles. Training includes live fire of mounted heavy and/or medium machine guns; reaction to contact, to include vehicle mounting and dismounting procedures; safety procedures to include roll over procedures; and operator level field maintenance skills, focusing on complete and thorough preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) and operator level deficiency corrections.

**New Equipment Training (NET).** Five training days that include initial inspection procedures, operator-level setup, equipment operation, disassembly for onward movement, and first-level (operator) trouble-shooting and maintenance. This training is typically provided for complex equipment pieces that ACOTA provides – communications equipment, vehicles, water purifiers and tents.

**PSO Multinational Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) Training.** The fifteen training days focus on preparing staff members within a command deploying to a peace support operation. Training specifically addresses the complexities of pre-deployment and unit movement planning of the force once it arrives in the area of operations, as well as the redeployment planning that must be accomplished before a units' mission is complete.

**PSO Inventory Training.** Duration varies depending on the size and composition of a shipment. For each shipment that the program provides a partner nation, a team of instructors goes to that country to work with an equal number of members from the partner military to verify the contents. This is not just to certify delivery but also enhance the logistical capability of the partner nation.

**Pre-deployment PSO Training for Military Police Cadre.** Twenty training days focused on military police cadre. Instructors train peacekeepers preparing to deploy to the United Nations missions that require designated police units. The training addresses the duties of military police in support of UN missions, as well as basic PSO soldier skills that includes live-fire rifle marksmanship training for the individual soldiers.



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## Notes

<sup>i</sup> This document uses Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention as the basis for defining protection of civilians for military personnel participating in peace operations as it is recognized by nations contributing forces to peace operations.

<sup>ii</sup> The military planning concepts in this Strategic Plan draw heavily from the Design Methodology in Field Manual 5-0, Joint Pub 5-0, Field Manual 3-0, Field Manual 3-07.31, and Field Manual 3-24.

<sup>iii</sup> Aspects of the framework presented here are based on US Joint Staff and US Army Doctrine; specifically, Joint Pub 1-02, Joint Pub 3-0, Joint Pub 3-07.3, Joint Pub 5-0, Field Manual 3-0, Field Manual 3-07.31, Field Manual 3-24, and Field Manual 3-90. The concepts presented and the tenets of the framework are aligned with doctrinal precepts and accord with proven tactical operational principles in active use by the many national military services.

<sup>iv</sup> Flexible Deterrent Option concepts presented are based on and aligned with US Joint Staff Doctrine; specifically, Joint Pub 3-0, Joint Pub 5-0.

<sup>v</sup> Key Tasks for POC have their origins in the military tasks found in FM 3-07.31 Peace Operations: Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conducting Peace Operations.



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